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Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings:
Reconciling Divergent Standards
LINDA GALLER*
I. INTRODUCTION

Ask a tax lawyer about the weight of a revenue ruling, and the response
would likely be something like this: "Revenue rulings do not bind taxpayers or
the courts, and merely state the position of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
as to how the law should apply to a particular set of stated facts."' Why, then,
are revenue rulings important? Your respondent would probably answer:
"Revenue rulings help us plan. Taxpayers who have advance notice of an IRS
position can make informed decisions on the structuring or reporting of a
transaction. 2 They may choose to comply with a revenue ruling position or to

* Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University. B.A., Wellesley College; J.D.
Boston University; LL.M., New York University. The author wishes to thank William
Buzbee, Nina Crimm, David Diamond, Eric Freedman, Mitchell Gans, Jay Hickey, and
Murray Singer for their helpful comments, and Patricia Kasting and Mena Sieber of the
Hofstra Law Library for assistance in locating sources. Special thanks to Stanley Mahoney
for his invaluable research assistance.
1 See, e.g., MICHAEL I. GRATZ, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 73 (2d ed. 1988);
MICHAEL I. SALrzmAN, IRS PRAICE AN IPRocnEnDu
3.03[21[b] (2d ed. 1991).
2 The IRS invites taxpayers to rely on revenue rulings, subject to some qualifications:
Taxpayers generally may rely upon revenue rulings and revenue procedures published
in the [Cumulative] Bulletin in determining the tax treatment of their own transactions
and need not request specific rulings applying the principles of a published revenue
ruling or revenue procedure to the facts of their particular cases. However, taxpayers,
Service personnel, and others concerned are also cautioned to determine whether a
revenue ruling or revenue procedure on which they seek to rely has been revoked,
modified, declared obsolete, distinguished, clarified, or otherwise affected by
subsequent legislation, treaties, regulations, revenue rulings, revenue procedures or
court decisions.
Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, 815.
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accept the risk of an IRS challenge by taking a contrary position. 3 Taxpayers
4
also save the cost and time of obtaining an advance ruling."

Are the views of our hypothetical lawyer correct? Most tax practitioners
would be surprised to learn that the answer is no. During the last five years,
traditional understandings have been remarkably disturbed. There is a
discernible campaign in the federal courts to give considerable, if not
controlling, weight to IRS revenue rulings. Not only does this practice diverge
from historical practices, but it also has resulted in a split among the courts that
has meaningful consequences.
Most circuit courts of appeals now give some degree of precedential weight
to revenue rulings. This newfound regard for rulings does not take one form,
however, as the courts have articulated three separate approaches. Under the
first, courts defer to revenue rulings because the rulings are reasonable and
consistent with the underlying statute. Under the second, courts defer to
revenue rulings because the rulings reflect statutory constructions by the agency
charged with statutory administration. Finally, under the third approach, courts
3 The penalty rules may require a taxpayer taking a contrary position to bring that
position to the IRS's attention by disclosing it on her return. Internal Revenue Code § 6662
imposes a penalty of twenty percent on substantial understatements of tax. I.R.C. § 6662(a),
(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993). The penalty may be reduced or avoided if the taxpayer discloses the
relevant facts affecting a questionable item's tax treatment and there is a reasonable basis for
the tax treatment of the item, or if there is "substantial authority" for her position. d.
§ 6662(d)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1993). Substantial authority exists when the weight of authorities
supporting the taxpayer's position is substantial in relation to the weight of authorities
supporting contrary positions. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)Ci) (1991). Revenue rulings are
among the types of authorities that may be considered, although many other authorities,
such as scholarly articles, may not. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)i) (1991). Thus, where the only
existing authority is a revenue ruling, the taxpayer must disclose the transaction to the IRS,
effectively inviting an audit, risk a substantial penalty, or comply with the IRS position.
Internal Revenue Code § 6662 also imposes a penalty for negligence or disregard of
rules or regulations. I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(1) (Supp. V 1993). A revenue ruling is
considered a rule or regulation of which "careless, reckless, or intentional" disregard may
result in a penalty. Id. § 6662(c). The mere existence of a revenue ruling imposes on
taxpayers an affirmative obligation not to disregard an IRS position and to exercise
reasonable diligence in determining the correctness of a contrary return position. The
penalty for disregarding rules or regulations may be avoided by disclosure if the taxpayer's
return position has at least a reasonable basis; the negligence penalty may not be avoided by
disclosure because a taxpayer is not considered to have been negligent with respect to a
position that has a reasonable basis. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-7(b), (c) (1995); see also WAYS
AND MEANs COMMrrrEE, OMNIBus BuDGE-T RECONCILIATION Acr

oF 1993, H.R. REP. No.

111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 754-55 (1993), reprintedin 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 984-86.
4 See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 655 F. Supp. 392, 400 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aftd,
855 F.2d 1360 (11th Cir. 1988) (observing that "accountants use revenue rulings as
'guidance' when interpreting tax laws").
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defer to revenue rulings because they believe that Oevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc.5 compels deference. Courts that have
enhanced the status of revenue rulings readily cite recent opinions rendered by
other circuit courts in support of deference, rather than their own prior
opinions, which invariably adopted a far less deferential posture.
The Tax Court6 has always eschewed deference, and continues to apply its
traditional standard. Revenue rulings merit no special weight in that court
because they are deemed merely to represent the contention of one litigating
party. The Tax Court's retention of a standard that contradicts circuit court
decisions is inconsistent with the court's normal practice of following circuit
7
court precedent.
The adoption of divergent approaches has profound consequences. As to
litigants, the choice of forum8 may categorically determine the substantive
outcome of a case. If the IRS can be expected to cite a revenue ruling,
taxpayers are likely to lose in federal court because federal judges defer to
rulings. Only the Tax Court offers an opportunity for full consideration of
taxpayer arguments. The lack of consistency among the circuits results in
inconsistent treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, who are confronted by a
different rule depending upon the circuits in which they reside and the courts in
5 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
6 The United States Tax Court was created by Congress under the authority of Article I
of the United States Constitution. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, §§ 951962, 83 Stat. 487, 730-36. For a description of the jurisdictional structure in federal tax
litigation, see infra note 8.
7 The Supreme Court has not spoken to the issue, but the Court has hinted that it is
aware of revenue rulings' ambiguous status. See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying
text.
8 Taxpayers may, at their option, litigate civil tax controversies in any of three trial
level courts: the Tax Court, a federal district court, and the Court of Federal Claims. LR.C.
§ 7442 (1988) (giving jurisdiction to the Tax Courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1977 &
Supp. V 1993) (giving jurisdiction to the district courts and the Court of Federal Claims).
For a thorough description of the scope of each court's jurisdiction and factors to cor.sider
in selecting an appropriate forum, see Nima J. Crimm, Tax Controversies: Ghoice ofForum,
9 B.U. I. TAX LAW 1 (1991). If the Tax Court is selected, the taxpayer can litigate without
first paying the deficiency. In order to litigate in a district court or the Claims Court, the
taxpayer must first pay in full all taxes covered by the suit, Flora v. United States, 362 U.S.
145 (1960), file a claim for refund, I.R.C. § 7422(a) (1988), and then commence a lawsuit
against the government. Appeals from the Tax Court are heard by the court of appeals for
the geographic circuit in which the taxpayer's legal residence is located or in which a
corporate taxpayer's principal place of business is located. I.R.C. § 7482 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); see infra note 240. Decisions of federal district courts are appealed to the regional
courts of appeals, 28 U.S.C. § 1294 (1988), and appeals from the Claims Court are to the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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which their disputes are heard. Ultimately, taxpayers in one circuit may not pay
the same taxes as similarly situated persons in other circuits.
On a systemic level, deference raises questions regarding the allocation of
jurisdiction over tax litigation. Concurrent jurisdiction over tax controversies
(among the federal courts and the Tax Court) is premised upon benefits that
supposedly are offered by each forum: expertise in the specialized Tax Court
versus broader perspectives in the generalist federal courts. To the extent that
federal court judges are willing to accept and abide by IRS revenue rulings,
their courts represent decidedly pro-government tribunals. Federal court judges
abdicate their role in the overall system by withholding the benefits for which
their participation is most valued.
This Article argues that revenue rulings should be treated consistently in all
judicial fora. 9 The diversity of approaches among the circuit courts suggests
that Supreme Court review is warranted. Without judicial resolution, legislative
intervention is appropriate; Congress should statutorily prohibit the citation of
revenue rulings as authority for substantive arguments, in the same way as it
has with IRS letter rulings.
This Article begins by examining the attributes of revenue rulings that
contribute to their distinctive status. Revenue rulings are not on a par with
regulations, which are entitled to judicial deference, but rulings deserve more
weight than other IRS statements of position. Thus, the issues treated in this
Article present themselves only with respect to such rulings. Part In analyzes
the disparate approaches adopted by the courts, and Part IV explains the circuit
courts' apparent eagerness to break with precedent and the Tax Court's firm
adherence to tradition. The generalist judges of the federal bench seem to be
actively searching for ways to defer, while the specialized Tax Court judges
show no interest in letting others decide tax questions. Part V considers the
consequences of the movement toward deference and the division among the
courts. On a practical level, the existence of a revenue ruling (on point) largely
controls the choice of forum. Judicial deference encourages the IRS to issue
revenue rulings simply as a means of ensuring success in court. Finally, the
courts' increasing tendency to defer to revenue rulings defeats the purposes
underlying allocation of jurisdiction over tax controversies, wherein generalist
federal judges were meant to contribute something more than a rubber stamp.

9 1 have argued elsewhere that the Tax Court's standard should be followed in all
courts. Linda Galler, Emerging Standardsfor Judficial Review of 1RS Revenue Rulings, 72

B.U. L. REv. 841 (1992). Therefore, this Article will not re-examine the issue of what the
uniform standard of review should be.
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II. THE UNIQUE CHARACTER OF REVENUE RULINGS
The nation's revenue laws are administered and enforced by the Treasury
Department, 1 0 primarily through the IRS." These duties are carried out in part

by the issuance of "rules and regulations"' 2 setting forth departmental positions
on selected issues. Statements of position take various forms, and are issued
with different degrees of formality and publicity, depending upon the format
selected. The significance or weight of a particular pronouncement in court is
largely a function of the formality and publicity associated with the issuance
process.

13

The IRS dispenses a steady volume and wide variety of information to
assist and advise taxpayers in complying with their obligations under the Code.
The least formal sort of guidance, oral advice, does not bind the agency or the
taxpayer, 14 while the most formal type, regulations, often are regarded as
equivalent to statutory law. 15 Between these two extremes lie a variety of other
formats, the most significant of which are revenue rulings and letter rulings.
The three major categories-regulations, revenue rulings, and letter rulingsgenerally are ranked in descending order for purposes of weight or importance.
10 I.R.C. § 7801(a) (1988).
"1
See I.R.C. § 7802(a) (1988).
12
Internal Revenue Code § 7805(a) (1988) authorizes the Treasury Secretary to
"prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Revenue
Code], including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any alteration of
law in relation to internal revenue." The Secretary has authorized the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to issue these departmental positions, subject to his approval. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7805-1(a) (1960).

13 See, e.g., Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1952) (noting
that exemption from APA notice and comment procedures affects the weight that courts will
accord to interpretive rulings). At least one court of appeals has explicitly concluded that
revenue rulings are entitled to less weight than regulations because regulations are
promulgated in accordance with APA notice and comment procedures. American Stores
Co. v. American Stores Co. Retirement Plan, 928 F.2d 986, 993 (10th Cir. 1991);
Flanagan v. United States, 810 F.2d 930, 934 (10th Cir. 1987); see also Johnson City
Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 979-80 (6th Cir. 1993) (Batchelder, J.,
dissenting).
14
See, e.g., United States v. Guy, 978 F.2d 934, 938 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that
taxpayer's reliance on oral statements of an IRS agent was unreasonable); Treas. Reg.
§ 601.201(k)(2) (as amended in 1983) (stating that IRS is not bound by oral advice offered
by its employees); Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 14. But cf I.R.C. § 6404(1) (1990)
(requiring the IRS to abate any penalty or addition to tax that is due to erroneous written
advice furnished by an IRS employee, but providing no relief where erroneous advice is
oral).
15 See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
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Confusion as to judicial weight is prevalent only with respect to revenue
rulings because they are hybrids. Like regulations, revenue rulings apply
generically rather than to a single recipient, as do letter rulings. Revenue ruling
issuance procedures, however, more closely resemble those of letter rulings,
which are released without the sort of public participation that is mandated as
to regulations. A substantial volume of judicial precedent states that regulations
are entitled to deference, 16 while the weight of letter rulings is carefully
prescribed by statute. The weight of revenue rulings, however, has been the
subject of a confusing and erratic judicial process in which courts are
increasingly likely to treat revenue rulings like regulations by deferring to IRS
positions that are set forth in the revenue ruling format. This section describes
the three regulatory formats and compares the standards that have been applied
to each, in an effort to demonstrate the uniqueness of revenue rulings and to
establish a framework for analyzing the courts' diverse approaches to
deference.
A. Regulatory Formats
1. Treasury Regulations
The most important rules are issued as Treasury regulations. 17 Substantive,
or legislative, regulations are issued pursuant to specific statutory authority.' 8
16

Of course, the standards for judicial review of regulations are themselves subject to

vigorous debates, particularly as to the repercussions of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See sources cited infra notes 69-77.
That dialogue, however, is taking place in leading law reviews among noted scholars and
jurists, so that judges know well which sources to consult for advice in answering questions
that may arise in tax litigation. Moreover, the participants in the regulation debate are
experts in a variety of substantive areas.
17 Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)(1) (as amended in 1983).
18 Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432
U.S. 416, 425 n.9 (1977); see also DEPARTMENT oF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANuAL ON THE ADMNISTRATlVE PROCEDURE Acr 30 n.3 (1947) [hereinafter ATORNEY
GENERAL's MANuAL]. For example, Treasury regulations governing consolidated income
tax returns for affiliated groups of corporations are legislative regulations because the Code
expressly authorizes their issuance. Wolter Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 634 F.2d
1029, 1035 (6th Cir. 1980).
Courts sometimes use the terms "substantive" and "legislative" interchangeably to
describe rules that are not interpretive. E.g., Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329,
331 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Wing v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17, 27 & n.11 (1983). Using the
term "substantive" in this context is confusing because it implies a distinction from
"procedural" rules, and interpretive rules relate to substance, not procedure. See Robert A.
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like-Should

1995]

DEFERENCE TO REVENUE RULINGS

1043

They implement the statute, and affect individual rights and obligations.' 9
Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),20 government agencies issuing
legislative regulations must provide prior notice to the public of the proposed
rulemaking, and must accord the public an opportunity to participate in the
rulemaking process by submitting written comments. 2 1 Final regulations must
be published in the Federal Register prior to their effective date, 22 along with a
general statement describing the basis and purpose of the regulations and
responses to objections and suggestions received from the public.23
Interpretive regulations emanate from an agency's general authority to
interpret and enforce a particular statute. 2 4 They express the agency's views on
what the statute means, and explain rights and duties that are already implicit in
the statute.25 Treasury regulations issued under the general authority of Internal
26
Revenue Code section 7805(a) are considered interpretive regulations.
FederalAgencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE LJ. 1311, 1321 n.37 (1992);
Michael Asimow, Public Participationin the Adoption of Interpretive Rules and Policy
Statements, 75 McH. L. REv. 521, 523 n.ll (1977).
Similarly, the term "interpretive" customarily is used in place of the statutory term
"interpretative." Anthony, supra at 1321 n.37; Asimow, supra at 522 n.6. Based on an
informal etymological study, however, Judge Shadur has concluded that "interpretative" is
the linguistically correct form. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 358,
361 n.4 (N.D. 11. 1988), aff'd in partand rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989).
19 See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979); General Motors Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985);
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at 30 n.3.

20 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1994).

21 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c). The agency may offer the opportunity to present comments

orally. Id. § 553(c). The Treasury Department's procedures for implementing APA notice
and comment requirements are contained in Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)-(c) (as amended in
1983).
22 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d); see also Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(1) (as amended in 1983);
Id. § 601.702(a) (as amended in 1987). The thirty day requirement may be waived for good
cause found and published with the rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(d).
23 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).
24 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); E. Norman Peterson
Marital Trust v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 790, 797 (1994).
25 General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985); cf. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at 30
n.3 (observing that interpretive rules advise the public of the agency's construction of the
statutes and rules that it administers).
26 See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24-25 (1982); Rowan
Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); Saint Jude Medical, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 34 F.3d 1394, 1400 n.ll (8th Cir. 1994); Ann Jackson Family Found. Inc.
v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 1994); Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United States, 773
F.2d 300, 303 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 464, 469
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Although the APA does not require agencies to follow notice and comment
procedures when issuing interpretive regulations, the Treasury Department
customarily complies with the
APA procedures with respect to both legislative
27
and interpretive regulations.
2. Revenue Rulings
A revenue ruling is an interpretation or explanation of the tax laws issued
by the IRS, and is designated as a "revenue ruling." 28 Revenue rulings
typically describe a set of hypothetical facts, and state the IRS's legal

(1994); E. Norman Peterson Marital Tnst, 102 T.C. at 797; see also Ellsworth C. Alvord,
Treasury Regulations and the Wilshire Oil Case, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 252, 259-62 (1940).
But see American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 358, 364 (N.D. 111. 1988),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1989). The district court refused to
follow the traditional paradigm, stating that
in the area of taxation and Treasury Regulations, it would seem more than a bit odd to
adopt a bright-line rule that every regulation adopted under the general authority of
[Internal Revenue] Code § 7805(a) must be 'interpretative' in the APA § 553 statutory
sense, while every regulation adopted under a more particularized statutory
authorization is not.
Id. The court noted that the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 651-678 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) contains parallel language to I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1988),
authorizing the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS)
to "prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to carry out their
responsibilities under this chapter," O.S.H.A. § 8(g)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 657(g)(2), and that the
OSHA language has been held to allow the issuance of both legislative and interpretive
regulations. American Medcal Ass'n, 688 F. Supp. at 364. The nature and substance of a
regulation, and not the source of authority for its promulgation, determines its status. ld.
(citing Chamber of Commerce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 468-70 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
27
See Asimow, supranote 18, at 524-25; Deborah A. Geier, Comentary: Textualsm
and Tax Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 445, 463 n.66 (1993); Mitchell Rogovin, The FourR's:
Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756, 759 (1965); Paul F.
Schmid, The Tax Regulations Making Process-Then and Now, 24 TAX LAW. 541, 541
(1971); see also Redhouse v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 1249, 1252 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting
Treasury's standard practice); American Medical Ass'n, 688 F. Supp. at 362 (arguing that
compliance with APA procedures does not resolve status of Treasury regulations because
procedures are followed with respect to both legislative or interpretive regulations); cf.
Treas. Reg. § 601.601(a)(2) (as amended in 1983) (mandating that notice and comment
procedures be followed where required by the APA and "in such other instances as may be
desirable").
28 See Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (as amended in 1983); Id. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (as
amended in 1983); see also Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 LR.B. 9, 14.
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conclusions based on those facts. 29 The same individuals who participate in the
formulation of Treasury regulations draft and review revenue rulings.
Attorneys in the Office of the Chief Counsel prepare the rulings for approval
by the Chief Counsel, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and Assistant
Secretary (Tax Policy).30 Because they are considered interpretive rules for
purposes of the APA, 3 1 revenue rulings are exempt from notice and comment
32
issuance procedures and are published without a precedent announcement.
33
Revenue rulings are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
The IRS describes the objectives of the revenue rulings program as
promoting uniform application of the tax laws and assisting taxpayers in
attaining maximum voluntary compliance. 34 In 1953, when the program
Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 14.
For a general overview of the review processes, see INTENAL REVENUE SERVICE,
CmP COUNSEL DmEcrlvE MANUAL (30)(15)10, CHmF COUNSEL PUBLICATIONS HANDBOOK
720-728 (1994) [hereinafter PUBLICATIONS HANDBOOKI; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
CmECoNsELDmECrivEMANuAL (30)(15)20
140-180 (1995).
31 Revenue rulings have been called the "classic example" of interpretive rules. Wing
v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 17, 27 (1983); see also Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. United States,
743 F.2d 539, 541 n.3 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1027 (1985); Redhouse v.
Commissioner, 728 F.2d 1249, 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. derded, 469 U.S. 1034 (1984). In her
dissenting opinion in Johnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 978-84
(6th Cir. 1993), Judge Batchelder argues that revenue rulings are not entitled to deference
under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), precisely because they are exempt from APA notice and comment requirements.
See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
32
The IRS may solicit comments and suggestions from taxpayers or taxpayer groups if
justified by special circumstances. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(f) (as amended in 1983).
33 Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(6) (as amended in 1983); id. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(a) (as
amended in 1983); see also Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 14; Rev. Proc. 89-14, 19891 C.B. 814, 814 (describing the standards for publication of revenue rulings and revenue
procedures).
Although the Bulletin contains other forms of announcements, revenue rulings and
revenue procedures are the only IRS statements of position or practice that must be
published there. Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(vi) (as amended in 1983); see also Rev. Proc.
89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 815. A revenue procedure is an official statement of procedure that
affects the rights or duties of taxpayers or other members of the public under the Internal
Revenue Code, related statutes, and regulations, or information that the IRS believes should
be a matter of public knowledge even if it does not affect the rights and duties of the public.
Treas. Reg. § 601.601(d)(2)(i)(b) (as amended in 1983); see also Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1
C.B. 814, 814.
On at least one occasion, the Government has argued that revenue procedures are
entitled to less weight than revenue rulings. See United States v. Metro Constr. Co., 602
F.2d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 1979).
34
29
30

Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, 814-15; accord PUBLICATIONS HANDBOOK,

supranote 30,

211.
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commenced, the agency identified three principal purposes. First, revenue
rulings would be a vehicle through which the National Office could inform
field personnel of precedents or guiding positions. 35 Second, the Internal
Revenue Bulletin would provide a permanent, indexed reference to IRS
positions. 36 Third, revenue rulings would enable the public to review
37
interagency communications that the IRS uses as precedents or guides.
Issuance of revenue rulings benefits the government as well as taxpayers.
From the government's perspective, uniformity in application of the law is
38
more likely to be attained through centralized interpretation of the Code.
Moreover, the issuance of revenue rulings reduces the burden on the letter
rulings program. 39 Advance notice of an IRS position enables taxpayers to
compute their taxes correctly in the first instance. 4° Those contemplating
transactions benefit as well from the elimination of surprise: 41 most taxpayers
will avoid controversy by complying with a revenue ruling 42 (thereby
minimizing the likelihood and cost of litigation to both sides), 43 while
taxpayers who elect not to comply are fully aware of the potential for
litigation. 44
35 Rev. Rul. 2, 1953-1 C.B. 484, 484; see also Genshaft v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.
282, 291-92 n.10 (1975); Packard v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 621, 637 (1975); Sandor v.
Commissioner, 62 T.C. 469, 481 (1974) (noting that the purpose of publication of revenue
rulings is to promote uniform application of tax laws by IRS employees), aft'd, 536 F.2d

874 (9th Cir. 1976).
36 Rev. Rul. 2, 1953-1 C.B. 484, 484.
37 Id.
38

Mortimer M. Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service: A
Statement of Principles, 20 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 1, 7 (1962); Rogovin, supra note 27, at

765; cf. Peter L. Strauss, 77w Rulemaking Continuwn, 41 DUKE L.J 1463, 1482 (1992)
(arguing that by informing the public of how agencies intend to carry out their functions,
interpretive rules contribute to uniformity in both enforcement and compliance).
39

Rogovin, supra note 27, at 765. For a description of the letter rulings program, see

infra notes 45-56 and accompanying text.

40 Caplin, supra note 38, at 7; Rogovin, supra note 27, at 765; cf. Strauss, supra note
38, at 1481-83 (making a similar argument as to all non-notice and comment agency

interpretations).
41 Caplin, supra note 38, at 7; cf Rogovin, supra note 27, at 765 (noting that advance
notice of thi IRS's position enables the taxpayer to decide whether to consummate a

contemplated transaction).
42

Norman A. Sugarman, Federal Tax Rulings Procedure, 10 TAX L. REV. 1, 4

(1954).
43 See Caplin, supra note 38, at 7; Rogovin, supra note 27, at 765; Sugarman, supra
note 42, at 4-5.
44 In order to avoid certain accuracy-related penalties under Internal Revenue Code
§ 6662, taxpayers may be required to disclose tax return positions that contravene IRS
revenue rulings. Thus, issuance of revenue rulings may increase the IRS's ability to detect
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3. LetterRulings
Like revenue rulings, letter rulings are written statements issued by the
RS, which interpret and apply the tax laws to a set of stated facts. 45 Unlike
revenue rulings, however, letter rulings are issued only to taxpayers who
specifically request them, and bind the agency only with respect to the
particular taxpayer to whom they are issued. Taxpayers voluntarily seek letter
rulings in advance of consummating transactions 46 in order to obtain a measure
of certainty or security with respect to the IRS.47 Letter rulings enable
48
recipients to prepare their tax returns in conformity with IRS interpretations,
49
and to protect themselves against adverse changes in IRS policies.

promising candidates for audit and litigation. See supra note 3. A similar disclosure rule
exists with respect to the preparer penalty. See I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
45 Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(2) (as amended in 1983); see also Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-

1 I.R.B. 9, 13.
46 Letter rulings may be issued only with respect to prospective transactions and
completed transactions before the tax return is filed. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(b)(1) (as

amended in 1983); see also Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 16-17. Rulings are not
issued, however, if the identical issue is present in a return of the taxpayer for a prior year
and that issue is under examination or audit by a district or appeals office or is pending in
litigation. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(b)(1); Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 17. For
procedures for requesting letter rulings, see Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9.
47
Rulings "take the -gamble out of a business transaction." Sugarman, supra note 42,
at 4; see also Gerald G. Portney, Letter Rulings: An Endangered Species?, 36 TAX LAW.
751, 754 (1983). By obtaining a letter ruling, the taxpayer knows in advance of the
transaction and the filing of her tax return precisely how the IRS will determine the tax
consequences of the transaction. Where the IRS position is adverse to the taxpayer's
expectations, the taxpayer still benefits from the elimination of surprise during a later audit.
Sugarman, supranote 42, at 4.
48 Portney, supranote 47, at 754.
49 The IRS may revoke or modify letter rulings that are found to be in error or not in
accord with the IRS's current views. Treas. Reg. § 601.201(0(4) (as amended in 1983); see
also Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 LR.B. 9, 41.
Except in rare or unusual circumstances, revocation or modification of a ruling
will not be applied retroactively... if (i)
there has been no misstatement or omission of
material facts, (ii)the facts subsequently developed are not materially different from the
facts on which the ruling was based, (iii)
there has been no change in the applicable
law, (iv) the ruling was originally issued with respect to a prospective or proposed
transaction, and (v) the taxpayer directly involved in the ruling acted in good faith in
reliance upon the ruling and the retroactive revocation would be to his detriment.
Treas. Reg. § 601.201(0(5); see also Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 41-42.
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Sometimes, taxpayers are required by statute to request a ruling seeking the
50
IRS's consent to, or approval of, a contemplated action.
Letter rulings are issued by the IRS National Office, 5 1 and must be applied
by a district office in determining a taxpayer's liability if the representations on
which the ruling is based reflect an accurate statement of the material facts and
if the transaction is carried out substantially as proposed.5 2 However, a letter
ruling applies only as to the taxpayer to which it is issued,5 3 and may not be
used or cited by the IRS as precedent in the disposition of other cases, or be
54
relied upon by other taxpayers.

Letter rulings are open to public inspection, 55 and are available through
private publishers in print and on-line. Names, addresses, and identifying
numbers are deleted before public disclosure, and other deletions may be
56
allowed in particular cases.

50

For example, taxpayers wishing to change methods of accounting must obtain the

IRS's consent. I.R.C. § 446(e) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(e)(2)(i), (e)(3) (as amended in

1993).
51 Treas. Reg. § 601.201(a)(2) (as amended in 1983); see also INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, CHIEF COUNSEL DIRECrIVE MANUAL (39)616.1 (1992). Depending on subject
matter, letter rulings are issued by the Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Domestic), the
Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations), the
Office of Associate Chief Counsel (Enforcement Litigation), or the Office of Associate
Chief Counsel (International). Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 13.
52 Treas. Reg. § 601.210(0(2) (as amended in 1983); see also Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1
I.R.B. 9,'41.
53 Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 41.
54
Treas. Reg. § 601.201(0(1) (as amended in 1983); cf. I.R.C. § 6110G)(3) (1988)
(declaring that letter rulings "may not be used or cited as precedent"). See infra notes 101112 and accompanying text.
55 I.R.C. § 6110(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-1 (1977). The text of any ruling
that is open to public inspection is located in the IRS National Office Reading Room. Treas.
Reg. § 301.6110-1(c)(1). Background file documents, including the ruling request, written
material filed by the taxpayer in support of the request, and any communications between
the IRS and others in connection with, but prior to the issuance of, the ruling, are available
for public inspection7 upon written request, I.R.C. § 6110(a), (b), (e) (1988); Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6110-1(b); Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-2(g) (1977), and may be examined in the National
Office Reading Room. Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-1(c)(1). Procedures for requesting
background fie documents are set forth in Rev. Proc. 88-11, 1988-1 C.B. 636.
56 I.R.C. § 6110(c) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-3 (1977).
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B. Standards of Review
1. Treasury Regulations
Legislative regulations have the same binding effect as statutes.5 7 When
Congress expressly directs an agency to prescribe standards for implementing a
statute, the courts consider that Congress intended to vest in the agency
authority to make binding rules.58 Thus, when a court reviews a legislative
regulation, its job is merely to determine whether the agency acted within its
delegated authority.5 9 Stated differently, the court must apply the regulation
unless it finds that the regulation is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
60
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law."
The status of interpretive regulations is unclear. Traditionally, interpretive
regulations have received less deference than legislative regulations. 61 Courts
have not considered themselves bound by interpretive rules because they regard
these rules merely as interpreting what the statute means. 62 The court's job,
under this view, is to determine whether the regulation implements the statute
57

Long v. United States, 652 F.2d 675, 678 n.7 (6th Cir. 1981); accord Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 295, 302 (1979); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425
(1977); cf. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL, supra note 18, at 30 n.3 (stating that legislative
regulations "have the force and effect of law").
58
Francis,432 U.S. at 425; cf. Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 304 (stating that there must be a
nexus between agency regulations and delegation of legislative authority by Congress in
order for the regulations to have the "force and effect of law").
59 See Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Rowan Cos. v. United
States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981); see also Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 6 (1983) ("[]'Judicial review of administrative
action contains a question of the allocation of law-making competence in every case, given
congressional power to delegate law-making authority to administrative agencies. The
court's interpretational task is... to determine the boundaries of delegated authority.").
60
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C) (1994); see Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); Gray
Panthers,453 U.S. at 44; Francis,432 U.S. at 426.
61 Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 1329, 1336 (5th Cir. 1989); see Rowan, 452 U.S.
at 253 (stating that an interpretive regulation was entitled to less deference than a regulation
issued under an express grant of authority to define a statutory term); see also United States
v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 135-36 & n.23 (3d Cir. 1994); Ann Jackson Family Found.
Inc. v. Commissioner, 15 F.3d 917, 920 (9th Cir. 1994); Thomas Int'l Ltd. v. United
States, 773 F.2d 300 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C.
464, 469 (1994).
62
General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder, 194 F.2d 329, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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in a reasonable manner. 63 The weight accorded to interpretive regulations
depends upon the thoroughness evident in the agency's consideration of the
rule, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and other factors that the reviewing court may deem
64
relevant.
In its seminal Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council,
Inc.65 decision, the Supreme Court may have rewritten the standards applicable
to judicial review of interpretive regulations. Although Chevron itself involved
legislative regulations, 66 the two-step analytical framework adopted by the
Court appears to encompass other forms of administrative interpretations as
well:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
63

Rowan, 452 U.S. at 252; Commissioner v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156,
169 (1981); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 476 (1979);
Brown, 890 F.2d at 1336; see also Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554,
560-61 (1991) (asserting that the Court must defer to Treasury regulations promulgated
under general authority of I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1988) so long as they are reasonable).
Opinions in tax cases often cite United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967), in
which the Court stated: "The role of the judiciary in cases of this sort begins and ends with
assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his authority to implement the
congressional mandate in some reasonable manner." Id. (emphasis added). Correll,
however, involved an interpretive ruling (I.T.) issued by the Income Tax Unit or Division
of the IRS, and not a regulation. See GAiL L. RICHMOND, FEDERAL TAX RESAR CH 59-60
(4th ed. 1990). The Correll Court's confusion in this regard is evident throughout its
opinion.
64
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976); Skidmore v. Swift &
Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944); see also Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v.
Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 190 (3d Cir. 1995) (Nygaard, J., dissenting) (arguing that Skdmore
and Gilbertcontinue to apply to interpretive rules). Among the factors considered by courts
are: whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language, origin, and purpose of the
statute; whether the regulation was issued contemporaneously with the statute that it
construes; the manner in which the regulation evolved; the length of time the regulation has
been in effect; the reliance placed on the regulation; the consistency of the agency's
interpretation; and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during
subsequent reenactments of the statute. See NationalMuffler, 440 U.S. at 477.
65 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
66 Anthony, supra note 18, at 1325 n.64; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration
After Chevron, 90 COLJM. L. REv. 2071, 2093 (1990). The regulations at issue in Chevron
were issued by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified in scattered sections of
Title 42 of the UnitedStates Code).
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Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does
not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
67
statUte.

A permissible construction is one that "represents a reasonable accommodation
of conflicting policies." 68 Under Chevron, a court must accept, or defer to, an
agency's construction regardless of the court's own views, so long as the
agency's position is reasonable.
Commentators have written extensively on the meaning of Chevron. In its
extreme, Chevron can be read to require courts to accept any reasonable agency
interpretation of a statute, if Congress has not explicitly provided a contrary
answer. 69 Thus, what makes Chevron "revolutionary" 70 is its firm mandate
that courts must accept agency positions (so long as they are reasonable), rather
71
than exercising their own independent judgment.
Chevron's deference principles can be explained in terms of democratic
theory. 72 While Congress is the ultimate source of lawmaking authority, the
problem addressed in Chevron is who should resolve questions that Congress
has failed to answer. As between courts and administrators, Chevron's selection
of the latter is based simply on political accountability. Neither judges nor
agencies are directly accountable to the electorate, but the President is.
Therefore, the executive branch of government should resolve competing
claims that arise under ambiguous or silent statutes. 73
awevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (footnotes omitted).
68 Id. at 845 (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-83 (1961)).
69
Thomas W. Merrill, JudicialDeference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J 969,
969 (1992); see also Kevin W. Saunders, Interpretative Rules with Legislative Effect: An
67

Analysis and a Proposalfor PublicParticipation,1986 DUKE L.J. 346, 365-66.
70
Kenneth W. Starr, JudicialReview in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE, I. ON REG.

283, 284 (1986).
71 Merrill, supra note 69, at 977; Starr, supra note 70, at 296.
72 See Merrill, supranote 69, at 978.
73 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
866 (1984). Professor Sunstein has noted that statutory interpretation is not merely a process
of reconstructing legislative will, but also involves the making of policy choices based on
extratextual considerations (such as how a statute is best implemented). In light of their
greater electoral accountability and fact-finding capacity, agencies are better suited than
courts to make these judgments. Sunstein, supranote 66, at 2087-88; see also Laurence H.
Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 821,
822-24 (1990); cf Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696 (1991) ("Judicial
deference to an agency's interpretation of ambiguous provisions of the statutes it is
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Where a statute explicitly directs an agency to issue rules, Congress's
intentions regarding the resolution of ambiguities or gaps are clear. But when
Congress is silent, can we not assume that Congress intended courts, rather
than agencies, to resolve ambiguities? Chevron answers this question by
presuming a delegation; 74 "whenever Congress has delegated authority to an
agency to administer a statute, it has also delegated authority to the agency to
interpret any ambiguities present in the statute." 75 Thus, so long as the agency
has the authority to implement a statute,7 6 deference to agency interpretations is
appropriate whether the delegation is explicit or implicit since an implicit
delegation is the equivalent of an express one. Chevron, then, has been
construed to mandate the same level of judicial deference for both interpretive
and legislative rules.

77

authorized to implement reflects a sensitivity to the proper roles of the political and judicial
branches.").
74 "Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency is implicit rather than explicit."
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844; see Miller v. United States, No. 94-3225, 1995 U.S. App.
LEXIS 25200, at *5 (8th Cir. Sept. 7, 1995) (asserting existence of "an implicit legislative
delegation of authority to the [Internal Revenue] Commissioner to clarify whether income
tax deficiency interest is 'properly allocable to a trade or business'").
75 Merrill, supra note 69, at 979; see also Saunders, supra note 69, at 356; Sunstein,
supra note 66, at 2084; Eric M. Braun, Note, Coring the Seedless Grape: A
Reinterpretiti'onof Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 986, 993-95
(1987). But see Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.. AM. U. 187, 195-96 (1992) (arguing that the
Court's presumption that Congress intends to delegate interpretive authority to agencies is
"wholly fictional").
76 In Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), the Court held that Chevron
applies only where the agency is exercising delegated authority. The Court stated that "[a]
precondition to deference .under Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative
authority." Id. at 649; see also Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696-98
(1991) (applying Chevron to Department of Labor regulations issued pursuant to
congressional delegation); Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116 (1989) (according
Chevron deference to regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor, who was
"specifically authorized" by statute to issue such regulations); cf Crandon v. United States,
494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, I., concurring) (arguing that advisory opinions issued by
the Attorney General were not entitled to Chevron deference because the courts, not the
Department, had responsibility for administering the criminal statute at issue).
77
Merrill, supra note 69, at 979; Saunders, supra note 69, at 365-66; cf Cynthia R.
Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 452, 471 n.79 (1989) ("Chevron's articulation of the deferential model
appears to be indifferent to the 'legislative/interpretive' rule construct."). But see Herz,
supra note 75, at 203-16 (arguing that although Chevron literally eliminates the category of
interpretive rules, the Supreme Court in practice analyzes interpretive rule and legislative
rule cases under different standards); Sunstein, supra note 66, at 2093-94 (arguing that
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Although the Supreme Court has not spoken definitively on the
applicability of Chevron to interpretive rules, 78 it has indicated an awareness
that the question is unresolved. For example, in Chicago v. Enviromnental
Defense Fund,7 9 the Administrator of the EPA issued a memorandum to EPA
Regional Administrators directing them to act in accordance with the agency's
construction of a statute. The Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) argued that
Chevron deference applies only to agency interpretations issued pursuant to

legislatively delegated lawmaking authority, e.g., legislative rules issued in
accordance with APA notice and comment procedures. Because the
interpretation at issue was announced in an internal agency memorandum that
was circulated only to regional agency offices, EDF argued that Chevron did
80
not apply.
The Court concluded that the statute was clear and unambiguous, and
rejected the EPA's construction as incompatible with its own reading.
Therefore, the Court did not reach the issue of deference. 8 ' In a footnote,
however, the Court stated:
In view of our construction of § 3001(i), we need not consider whether an
agency interpretation expressed in a memorandum like the Administrator's in
this case is entitled to any less deference under Chevron than an interpretation
adopted by rule published in the Federal Register .... 82
Similarly, in United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 83 the Court
expressly declined to determine the amount of deference owed to IRS revenue
85
rulings 84 despite extensive briefing by the government.
Chevron should not apply to agency interpretations that are not issued through APA
rulemaking procedures).
78 But see EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 260 (1991) (Scalia, I.,
concurring) ("Inan era when our treatment of agency positions is governed by Chevron, the
'legislative rules vs. other action' dichotomy of [General Electric Co. v.] Gilbert is an
anachronism.").
79 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994).
80
Brief for Respondents at 7, Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct.
1588 (1994) (No. 92-1639).
81 The Court's conclusion that the statute was not ambiguous precluded any need for
Chevron deference. Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion, previously had argued
that "strict constructionist" judges rarely defer to agency interpretations because they rarely
find that statutes are ambiguous. Antonin Scalia, Judlicial Deference to Administrative
InterpretationsofLaw, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 521; see also Richard I. Pierce, The Supreme
Court's New Jypertextudaism An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the
Administrative
State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 777-78 (1995).
82
EnviromnentalDefense Fund, 114 S. Ct. at 1594 n.5.
83 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
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Without formal guidance or precedent, the courts of appeals have divided
on the issue of applicability of Chevron to interpretive rules, including
regulations. The Courts of Appeals for the D.C., 86 Third, 87 Fourth, 88 and
Sixth 89 Circuits apply Chevron to interpretive regulations, 90 while the Fifth, 91
84
85

Id.at 518 n.9.

Brief for Petitioner at 15-17, United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co., 504
U.S. 505 (1992) (No. 91-164); see also Commissioner v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2006, 2013 n.3 (1993) (declining to rule on deference to IRS revenue rulings and
Department of Labor advisory opinions, despite strenuous briefing on the issue); Petitioner's
Brief at 29, 30 n.20, Keystone (No. 91-1677); Respondent's Brief at 39-41, Keystone (No.
91-1677); cf. Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554, 562 (1991) (presuming
that the government had not argued for deference to two relevant revenue rulings because
they were issued after the transaction at issue had occurred). In Davis v. United States, 495
U.S. 472 (1990), the Court analyzed the weight of IRS revenue rulings without ever
mentioning Chevron.
86 Health Ins. Ass'n of America, Inc. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 424 n.8 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (Medicare regulations issued by the Health Care Financing Administration), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1095 (1995); see Wagner Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F:2d 918, 920 (D.C.
Cir. 1991) (denial by EPA of reimbursement for hazardous waste cleanup costs), cer.
denied, 503 U.S. 970 (1992); Theodus v. McLaughlin, 852 F.2d 1380, 1383-87 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (Department of Labor interpretive regulations); United Technologies Corp. v. EPA,
821 F.2d 714, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (EPA final rule); General Motors Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1566-67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (EPA interpretive rule).
87
Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir.
1995) (directive issued to state Medicaid directors by Director of Health Care Financing
Administration Medicaid Bureau). In a dissenting opinion, Judge Nygaard argued that
Chevron does not apply to interpretive rules. Id. at 189-94 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
88
Kennedy v. Shalala, 995 F.2d 28, 30 (4th Cir. 1993) (Social Security ruling).
89 CenT-a, Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1051, 1055-57 (6th Cir. 1992) (interpretive
Treasury regulation and revenue ruling, read together). In a dissenting opinion, Judge
Batchelder questioned the application of Chevron to interpretive regulations. Johnson City
Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 978-83 (6th Cir. 1993) (Batchelder, I.,
dissenting). Judge Batchelder's opinion took issue with the majority's application of Chevron
to revenue rulings. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
90
I Guadamuz v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1988), the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit applied Chevron deference to a regulation issued by the Secretary of HHS
without notice and comment. Id. at 767-71. In discussing deference standards, the court
characterized the regulation as legislative, despite the agency's noncompliance with
mandatory APA procedures. Id. at 768. Oddly, the court later concluded that the regulation
was exempt from notice and comment requirements because it was interpretive. Id. at 771.
91 Nalle v. Commissioner, 997 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1993) (interpretive Treasury
regulation); see Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 911 F.2d 1128, 1137-38 (5th Cir.
1990) (noting, in a case involving legislative Treasury regulations, that legislative
regulations are given controlling weight under Chevron, while interpretive regulations
deserve less deference under standards prescribed in other decisions); see also McKnight v.
Commissioner, 7 F.3d 447, 450-51 (5th Cir. 1993) (interpretive Treasury regulation). In

DEFERENCE TO REVENUE RULINGS

1055

Seventh, 92 and Tenth93 Circuits do not. Although the Third Circuit recently
decided that Chevron applies to interpretive rules, 94 it had previously asserted
that interpretive Treasury regulations are somehow different from non-tax
regulations, and therefore might be entitled to less weight than legislative
95
regulations, even under Chevron.
Outside the tax area, agencies issuing interpretive regulations typically do
not comply with APA notice and comment issuance procedures. Thus, with the

Griffon v. HHS, 802 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1986), the court declined to decide "whether
Chevron or a less exacting standard applies to interpretative rules." Id. at 148 n.3. Grffon
regulations issued by HHS.
involved
92
Pennington v. Didrickson, 22 F.3d 1376, 1383 (7th Cir.) (draft bills provided to
state legislatures by Department of Labor), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 613 (1994); Hanson v.
Espy, 8 F.3d 469, 472-73 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Chevron deference to regulations that
the court considered legislative); Doe v. Reivitz, 830 F.2d 1441, 1445-47 (7th Cir. 1988)
(HHS policy letter). But see Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1327-28 (7th
Cir. 1990) (denial by EPA of reimbursement for hazardous waste cleanup costs).
93 Headrick v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 1994) (comment
accompanying Department of Labor final regulations). The Headrick opinion was written
by retired Supreme Court Justice White, who sat by designation under 28 U.S.C. § 294(a)
(1988). Because Justice White was a member of the Court that issued Chevron, his
assertions regarding the nonapplicability of Chevron deference to interpretive rules may
the understandings or intentions of that Court.
reflect
94
Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. for Women v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 182 (3d Cir.
1995). Prior to Blackwell, the Third Circuit had explicitly declined to decide the issue. See
Reich v. Local 30, 6 F.3d 978, 987 n.14 (3d Cir. 1993) (interpretive regulation issued by
Department of Labor); International Raw Materials, Ltd. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 978 F.2d
1318 (3d Cir. 1992) (Federal Trade Commission advisory opinion), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1588 (1993).
95 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Commissioner, 41 F.3d 130, 135-36 & n.23 (3d
Cir. 1994). The court's suggestion that tax regulations might be governed by different
standards than other regulations might reflect a belief that tax law is a self-contained body of
law that is distinct from other areas. The tendency among generalist judges to regard tax
law as different might explain why they tend to defer to the IRS. See infra notes 222-24 and
accompanying text.
In Central Pa. Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 384 (1995), the Tax Court cited
du Pont in noting that there is a question as to -whether Chevron applies to interpretive
regulations. 104 T.C. at 392. The court found it unnecessary to differentiate between
Chevron and traditional standards for purposes of the case at hand, but stated that it regards
Chevron as merely restating the traditional standards "with possibly subtle distinctions as to
the role of legislative history and the degree of deference to be accorded to a regulation."
Id. In Chevron Corp. v. Commissioner, 104 T.C. 719, 728 (1995), however, the Tax Court
applied Chevron to interpretive Treasury regulations.
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exception of tax cases involving interpretive Treasury regulations, 96 all of the
cases considering the application of Chevron to interpretive rules deal with nonnotice and comment rules. One wonders how these 'precedents are meant to
apply to the apparently lunusual circumstance of notice and comment
interpretive regulations, 97 and more importantly for purposes of this Article,
whether compliance with notice and comment issuance procedures is the
determinative factor in the application or nonapplication of Chevron. This point
becomes particularly important when considering the weight of revenue
rulings, which are distinguishable from interpretive Treasury regulations
precisely because notice and comment procedures do not apply. 98
2. Revenue Rulings
Prior to the last several years, standards for judicial review of revenue
rulings were not controversial. The courts generally agreed that revenue rulings
were never binding on them. The Tax Court regarded rulings merely as the
position of a litigating party, not as substantive authority, and most courts of
appeals agreed. 99 Those courts that conferred additional weight to revenue

rulings generally did so on the basis of the IRS's expertise. Thus, a court might
justify according rulings some degree of special consideration because they
"express the studied view of the agency whose duty it is to carry out the
statute."100

In recent years, the federal courts have aggressively embraced a variety of
deference standards, which profoundly disturb traditional understandings of the
role and weight of revenue rulings. Revenue rulings now are accorded
considerable weight in some courts, although the precise status and underlying
rationales differ. These diverse approaches are discussed in Part M of this
Article.

96 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 49 F.3d 120 (4th Cir.
1995); Hefi v. Conmissioner, 983 F.2d 868 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2349
(1993); Peoples Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Commissioner, 948 F.2d 289 (6th Cir. 1991).
97 The Third Circuit has not explained why it distinguishes between interpretive
Treasury regulations from interpretive regulations outside the tax area. See du Pont, 41
F.3d at 135-36 & n.23.
98 See generally Galler, supra note 9, at 862-75.
99 See cases cited in Galler, supra note 9, at 850-51 nn.57-58.
100

Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985); see cases
cited in Galler, supranote 9, at 851-52 n.59.
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3. LetterRulings
By statute, letter rulings "may not be used or cited as precedent." 101 What
is meant by "precedent" in this context is not clear. The legislative history to
Internal Revenue Code section 6110(0)(3) does not portray precedent in the
stare decisis sense, but rather speaks in terms of nonreliance on rulings issued
to others.1 °2 The statute was meant to prevent taxpayers from relying on
rulings issued to other taxpayers 103 and to clarify that the Service cannot be
compelled to issue a ruling that resembles one already issued to another
similarly situated applicant. 104 Only the taxpayer to whom a letter ruling is
issued may rely on the ruling, and the IRS must apply a letter ruling only as to
the tax liability of the recipient. 105
The IRS Manual expressly forbids employees from relying on, using, or
citing letter rulings as precedents in the disposition of cases. 1°6 Despite the
101 I.R.C. § 6110G)(3) (1988); see also Treas. Reg. § 301.6110-7(b) (1977).
102
See WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, TAX REFoRM Acr OF 1976, H.R. REP. No.
658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 312, 315, 322-23 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3208-09, 3211-12, 3218-20; FINANCE COMMrrrEE, TAX REFORM Acr OF 1976, S. REP.
No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.1, at 303, 311, 343 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. pt.1, at 3732-33, 3740-41, 3772-73; see also Lawrence Zelenak, Should
Cous Require the Internal Revenue Service to be Consistent?, 38 TAX L. REV. 411, 437
(1985).
103 Zelenak, supra note 102, at 434. The legislative history also clarifies that taxpayers
who receive rulings may not rely on those rulings with respect to subsequent similar
transactions unless the ruling specifies its applicability. H.R. REP. No. 658, supra note 102,
at 323, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3218-20; S. REP. No. 938, supra note 102, at
311, reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3740-41.
104 Letter from Thomas F. Field to Gerald G. Portney (March 18, 1981), in 12 TAX
NOTES 626, 627 (1981). Of course, one would expect the IRS to act consistently by treating
similarly situated taxpayers equally.
105 Rev. Proc. 95-1, 1995-1 I.R.B. 9, 41. A letter ruling is binding only if the District
Director ascertains that:
(1) the conclusions stated in the letter ruling are properly reflected in the return; (2) the
representations upon which the letter ruling was based reflected an accurate statement
of the material facts; (3) the transaction was carried out substantially as proposed; and
(4) there has [not] been any change in the law that applies to the period during which
the transaction or continuing series of transactions were consummated.
Id. A letter ruling may be revoked or modified unless it is accompanied by a closing
agreement. Id. at 41. Thus, the IRS is not bound by a letter ruling unless there is an
accompanying closing agreement. See I.R.C. § 7121 (1988).
106 INThrNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL (39)153 (1992); see also Treas. Reg.
§ 601.601(d)(1), (d)(2)(v)(d) (as amended in 1983) (stating that unpublished rulings may not
be relied upon, used, or cited by any IRS employee as precedent in the disposition of other
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prohibition, however, the agency does rely on prior letter rulings in the
disposition of subsequent ruling requests. Letter rulings that are deemed to
have "reference value," as well as supporting documents, are retained in a
reference file.107 When consideration of a ruling request indicates that a prior
letter ruling position should be reversed or substantially modified, the new
ruling may be issued only after a detailed memorandum is submitted to, and
approved by, the Assistant or Associate Chief Counsel. 108 These seemingly
contradictory provisions can be reconciled only by reading the former proviso
as merely precluding the citation of an earlier ruling in a later one, and not as
preventing the revocation of erroneous rulings. 10 9 Reference to earlier rulings
is permitted within the agency, but not in letter rulings that are sent to
taxpayers.110
Courts have interpreted section 6110G)(3) in stare decisis terms, to mean
that letter rulings cannot be cited as authority.' Nonetheless, courts refer to
2
letter rulings as evidence of administrative practices.1
cases); Rev. Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, 815. But see lames P. Holden & Michael S.
Novey, Legitimate Uses of Letter Rulings Issued to Other Taxpayers-A Reply to Gerald
Portney, 37 TAx LAW. 337, 345 (1984) (reporting that the then-current Internal Revenue
Manual explicitly directed examining agents to use letter rulings as precedent and as a
research tool in formulating district office positions); see also Tax Analysts & Advocates v.
Internal Revenue Serv., 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973), modified, 505 F.2d 350 (D.C.
Cir. 1974) (describing the IRS's internal use of letter rulings prior to enactment of I.R.C.

§ 6110).
107 INTrENAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL 1(15)59, RECoRDs DIsPOsrTON HANDBOOK
110(2)(b)(3), Exhibit 100-1 item no. 22 (1994); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MANUAL
(39)252(2)(b)(3), Exhibit (30)200-3 (1992).
108 INTERNALREVENUE SERVICEMANUAL (39)152 (1992).
109 Zelenak, supranote 102, at 442-43.
110 ld. Messrs. Holden and Novey recount an informal statement by a former lower
level IRS employee that letter rulings are persuasive to IRS staff members because "we
know that the guys that wrote them were on our side." Holden & Novey, supranote 106, at
346.
111 E.g., Estate of Spencer v. Commissioner, 43 F.3d 226, 234 (6th Cir. 1995); c~f
Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 280 n.2
(7th Cir.) (refusing to consider the portion of a brief that "relies exclusively on the IRS
private letter ruling as authority"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 820 (1990).
112 See, e.g., Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 261-62 n.17 (1981);
Wolpaw v. Commissioner, 47 F.3d 787, 792 (6th Cir. 1995); Spencer, 43 F.3d at 234;
Harco Holdings Inc. v. United States, 977 F.2d 1027, 1035 n.13 (7th Cir. 1992); Transco
Exploration Co. v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 1992); cf. CSI Hydrostatic
Testers, Inc. v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 398, 409 n.10 (1994) (noting that statutory
interpretations set forth in letter rulings are "entitled to no more deference than a litigating
position before this Court"); see also No Regs. ? Appellate Court Ctes Letter Ruling Against
RS, 82 J. TAx'N 380 (1995) (proposing a "Theorem of Authoritative Letter Rulings":
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III. STANDARDS FOR REVIEW OF REVENUE RULmNGS

A. Tax Court
The Tax Court is unique in its absolute refusal to yield to IRS revenue
ruling positions. It regards revenue rulings as nothing more than the IRS's
position with respect to the factual situations and legal issues presented, and
treats rulings merely as the contention of a litigant.' 13 Revenue rulings are
never considered binding precedent. n 4 The court may, of course, take a ruling
5
into consideration."

"although Section 61100) provides that letter rulings cannot be cited as 'binding precedent,'
the courts will find a way to use them directly or indirectly as legal authority whenever they
so desire").
13 Pasqualini v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 1, 8 n.8 (1994); Exxon Corp. v.
Commissioner, 102 T.C. 721, 726 n.8 (1994); Spiegelman v. Commissioner, 102 T.C.
394, 405 (1994); Rath v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 196, 205 n.10 (1993); Halliburton Co.
v. Commissioner, 100 T.C. 216, 232 (1993), aff'd, 25 F.3d 1043 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
115 S.Ct. 486 (1994); Sunstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1305, 1307
(1992), afl'd, 17 F.3d 965 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 83 (1994); Induni v.
Commissioner, 98 T.C. 618, 624 n.4 (1992), aff'd, 990 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1993).
114 Krumhorn v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 29, 43 n.20 (1994); Exxon, 102 T.C. at
726 n.8; Estate of Hubert v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 314, 325 (1993); Halliburton, 100
T.C. at 232; Sunstrand, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1307; Vulcan Materials Co. v.
Commissioner, 96 T.C. 410, 418 (1991); cf Simon v. Commissioner, 103 T.C. 247, 263
n. 14 (1994) (stating that revenue rulings are not entitled to judicial deference).
The Tax Court frequently cites a Fifth Circuit opinion, Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc. v.
United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1971), as authority for its persistent nondeference position. See, e.g., K-nhwrn, 103 T.C. at 43 n.20; Halliburton, 100 T.C. at
232. On October 10, 1995, a search in the WESTLAW FIX-TCT database indicated that
the Tax Court has cited Stubbs 67 times. Interestingly, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit does not consider Stubbs a controlling precedent, and in fact defers to revenue
rulings with some regularity. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
115 Martin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C.M. (CCH) 1529, 1531 (1992); Pepcol Mfg. Co.
v. Commissioner, 98 T.C. 127, 136 n.4 (1992), rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 1013
(10th Cir. 1993). Although expressly noting the non-precedential status of revenue rulings,
the Tax Court has occasionally taken rulings into account. See, e.g., Spiegelman, 102 T.C.
at 394 (noting soundness of a revenue ruling's underlying rationale); Estate of Ford v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 1507, 1511 n.8 (1993) (taking into account principles set
forth in a revenue ruling), afftd, 53 F.3d 924 (8th Cir. 1995); Bell Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n
v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 376, 379 (1991) (noting that longstanding revenue
rulings adopt the position favored by the court), rev'd on other grounds, 40 F.3d 224 (7th
Cir. 1994).
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The Tax Court recently strayed from its customary rule of non-deference in
GeisingerHealth Plan v. Commissioner 1 6 because it understood the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit to require that the rulings at issue be given
weight. 117 The court, however, explicitly declared that its own practice is to
regard revenue rulings as merely the interpretation of one of the parties to the
litigation, which is entitled to no precedential effect. 118
The Tax Court's adherence to the Third Circuit standard is consistent with
the GolsenI1 9 rule, under which the Tax Court will follow a court of appeals
decision that is "squarely in point," where an appeal lies to that court of
appeals. 120 It is odd, however, that the Tax Court would acquiesce in only one
case of literally hundreds, particularly where its own position so clearly
contradicts those of most circuit courts. One might hypothesize that the Tax
Court does not consider itself bound under Golsen by procedural rules, perhaps
because they are not "squarely in point," but historical precedents in "strong
proof" cases (another procedural area in which courts of appeals have adopted
12 1
conflicting standards) suggest otherwise.
116 100 T.C. 39"4 (1993), aff'd, 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994). In comparison, see the
Tax Court's original opinion. Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCII)
1656 (1991), rev'd, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993).
117 The appellate court's rationale for according weight to the revenue rulings is
unclear. Although the Third Circuit explicitly recognized that revenue rulings are not
binding, it applied them because neither litigant had challenged their validity. The IRS had
contended merely that the Tax Court had misapplied the applicable statute, regulations, and
rulings. Gei'nger, 985 F.2d at 1215 n.2. On remand, when the Tax Court acknowledged
its obligation to follow the Third Circuit, it stated that "the interpretations of the
Commissioner must be given weight in this context." Geisinger, 100 T.C. at 405 (citing
Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.2, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993),
rev'g 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656 (1991)). Perhaps the context referred to is the qualification of
hospitals for tax exempt status, an area in which revenue rulings have played a significant
role. See, e.g., Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org. v. Simon, 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
118 Geisinger, 100 T.C. at 405 (citing Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985
F.2d 1210, 1215 n.2, 1216 (3d Cir. 1993), rev'g 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1656 (1991)).
119 Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742 (1970), aft'd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.),
404 U.S. 940 (1971).
cert. denied,
120
Id.at 757.
121 The strong proof doctrine provides that "when the parties to an agreement have
clearly and unambiguously set out the terms of their agreement, the taxpayer must adduce
strong proof to demonstrate that the true agreement of the parties was other than the
language of the written agreement." State Pipe & Nipple Corp. v. Commissioner, 46
T.C.M. (CCI-) 415, 418 (1983) (emphasis added). While several courts of appeals follow
the "strong proof" doctrine, others have adopted a stricter test (the Danielson rule), under
which a taxpayer may challenge the substance of an unambiguous provision "by adducing
proof which in an action between the parties to the agreement would be admissible to alter
that construction or to show its unenforceability because of mistake, undue influence, fraud,
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B. Courts ofAppeals
The courts of appeals traditionally have agreed that revenue rulings do not
have the force and effect of Treasury regulations 122 and are not binding on the
duress, etc." Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 858 (1967). Although the Tax Court prefers the strong proof approach, it follows the
Danielson rule in cases appealable to courts of appeals that follow Danielson. Meredith
Corp. v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 406, 438 (1994) (following the strong proof rule because
the Eighth Circuit had not yet ruled on the issue); Estate of Robinson v. Commissioner, 101
T.C. 499, 513-14 (1993) (following the Danielson rule because the Eleventh Circuit had
adopted it); State Pipe & NMpple, 46 T.C.M. (CCII) at 418 n.3 (following the strong proof
rule because the Second Circuit had adopted it). For a historical and policy analysis of the
strong proof doctrine, see Nickolas 3. Kyser, Substance, Fonn, and Strong Proof,11 AM. J.
TAX POL'Y 125 (1994). See also Roman V, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCI-) 1278,
1283 (1987) (applying Third Circuit rule on burden of proof); Graff v. Commissioner, 52
T.C.M. (CCII) 1025, 1029 (1986) (applying Ninth Circuit rule on burden of proof); cf
Platzer v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCIi) 150, 150 (1981) (declining to decide whether
Golsen "applied to procedural issues as well as substantive legal issues"); O'Heron v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCII) 145, 146 (1981) (declining to decide whether Golsen
"applied to procedural issues as well as substantive legal issues").
Of course, it might be difficult to distinguish between rules or rulings that are
considered procedural and those that are considered substantive. It would seem here,
however, that the distinctions drawn for purposes of diversity jurisdiction, pursuant to Erie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and its progeny, would be inapposite because the
Golsen rule implicates neither issues of federalism nor the allocation of judicial power
between the state and federal systems. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474-75 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring).
122
Higginson v. United States, 238 F.2d 439, 446 (1st Cir. 1956); Brook, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986); Strick Corp. v. United States, 714
F.2d 1194, 1196 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984); Miami Beach First
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d 475, 478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984
(1971); Babin v. Commissioner, 23 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct.
421 (1994); United States v. Wisconsin Power & Light Co., 38 F.3d 329, 334 (7th Cir.
1994); United States v. Eddy Bros., Inc., 291 F.2d 529, 531 (8th Cir. 1961); American
Stores Co. v. American Stores Co. Retirement Plan, 928 F.2d 986, 994 (10th Cir. 1991);
Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985); Trainer v. United
States, 800 F.2d 1086, 1090 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 905 (1987); Rev.
Proc. 89-14, 1989-1 C.B. 814, 815; see also Davis v. United States, 495 U.S. 472, 484
(1990); Estate of Kincaid v. Commissioner, 85 T.C. 25, 29 (1985); cf Watts v. United
States, 703 F.2d 346, 350 n.19 (9th Cir. 1983) (noting that unlike Treasury regulations,
revenue rulings do not have "the force and effect of law").
In American Stores, the court explained that revenue rulings have less weight than
regulations because rulings are not issued in accordance with APA notice and comment
procedures. 928 F.2d at 994; see also Iohnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d
973, 979-80 (6th Cir. 1993) (Batchelder, J., dissenting); Flanagan v. United States, 810
F.2d 930, 934 (10th Cir. 1987).
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courts1 23 Virtually every circuit court, however, has issued contradictory
opinions regarding the weight of revenue rulings. In some cases, revenue
rulings receive special consideration, while in others the same courts declare
that rulings are entitled to none.124 Explanations of the inconsistencies are
never provided.
Prior to the last several years, courts that conferred weight or special
consideration to revenue rulings typically based their determinations on the
IRS's role in administering the Code. The Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits, for example, gave weight to revenue rulings
because they expressed "the studied view of the agency whose duty it is to
carry out the statute." 125 The Ninth Circuit regarded rulings as "helpful in
interpreting the law by indicating the trend of opinion among administrators
126
experienced with the tax laws."
The courts of appeals are moving away from the Tax Court in a noticeable
and substantively significant way. Decisions rendered during the last five years
indicate an ardent willingness to accede to revenue rulings. The courts have not
adopted a uniform deference standard, however, but utilize one of three

approaches:
1. Reasonable and Consistent. Some courts defer to revenue rulings
because the rulings are reasonable and consistent with the underlying statute.

The courts' assertion that rulings occupy a lesser status is called into question by
Chevron. If courts are required to accept reasonable interpretations that are set forth in the
revenue ruling format, then rulings effectively occupy a status equivalent to that of
regulations. See generally Galler, supra note 9, at 857-69. With one exception, however,
the courts of appeals thus far have not applied Chevron to revenue rulings. See Johnson
Cty, 999 F.2d at 973; CenTra, Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1051, 1055 (6th Cir. 1992).
123 E.g., Julia R. & Estelle L. Found. Inc. v. Commissioner, 598 F.2d 755, 757 n.3
(2d Cir. 1979); Babb v. Olney Paint Co., 764 F.2d 240, 242 (4th Cir. 1985); Stubbs,
Overbeck & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1147 (5th Cir. 1971); Kaiser v.
United States, 262 F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1958), aft'd, 363 U.S. 299 (1960); Mercantile
Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 441 F.2d 364, 368 (8th Cir. 1971); Bolker v.
Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 1985); Trainer v. United States, 800 F.2d
1086, 1090 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
124 See cases cited in Galler, supra note 9, at 850-52 n.58.
125 Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.5 (I1th Cir. 1985); accordFoil
v. Commissioner, 920 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1990); Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799
F.2d 833, 836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986).
126 Confederated Tribes v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878, 881 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1040 (1983); see also Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 350 n.19 (9th Cir.
1983); Ricards v. United States, 683 F.2d 1219, 1224 n.12 (9th Cir. 1981).
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2. Deference to Administrators. Some courts defer to revenue rulings
because the rulings reflect statutory constructions by the agency charged with
statutory administration.
3. Oevron. Some courts defer to revenue rulings because they believe that
the Geron decision compels deference. 127
These three justifications for deference to revenue rulings, and their evolution,
are described in this section.
As a preliminary matter, however, it may be noted that the courts' eager
(and historically unprecedented) adoption of deferential standards violates
customary principles of intracircuit stare decisis under which the decisions of
three judge panels are binding on subsequent panels unless overruled by the
court en banc. 128 Circuit courts that have embraced deference have readily
cited opinions rendered by other circuit courts rather than their own prior
opinions, which invariably adopted a far less deferential posture.
1. Reasonable and Consistent
The reasonable and consistent standard was first applied to a revenue
ruling by the District Court for the Southern District of New York in a 1979
decision, Dunn v. United States.129 That court declared that revenue rulings
"have the force of legal precedents unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code."130 Prior to Dunn, the reasonable and
12 7

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984). Chevron is discussed at supra notes 65-95 and accompanying text.
12 8
See 1B JAMES W. MooRE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcric
0.402[1] (2d ed.
1993 & Supp. 1993-94); Allan D. Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict,
Concwrence and Synthesis ofJudicialPolicies, 55 N.C. L. REv. 123, 161-62 (1977); see
also 28 U.S.C.A. RULES, pt. I, 3d Cir. app. I, IOP § 39.1 (West Supp. 1995) (The Internal

Operating Procedures for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals-Chapter 9-In Bane
Consideration) ("It is the tradition of this court that the holding of a panel in a reported
opinion is binding on subsequent panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in

a published opinion of a previous panel. Court in banc consideration is required to do so.");
Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman, 939 F.2d 1207, 1211 (5th Cir. 1991) ("In this
circuit, one panel may not overrule the decision, right or wrong, of a prior panel in the
absence of an intervening contrary or superseding decision by the court en bane or the

Supreme Court."), reh'ggranted, 946 F.2d 1573 (5th Cir. 1991), af'd,959 F.2d 1283 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992). In Furman v. Cirrito, 741 F.2d 524, 525 (2d
Cir. 1984), vacated, 473 U.S. 922 (1985), a panel of the Second Circuit followed two prior
decisions by other Second Circuit panels even though it strongly disagreed with the earlier
opinions.
129 468 F. Supp. 991, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

130 Id.
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consistent standard had been applied only to regulations. 131 Neither the district
court nor the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had ever followed such a
radical approach as to rulings, and the authorities from other judicial circuits
that were cited in Dunn do not support the court's conclusion. Nonetheless,
several circuit courts have adopted a similar standard.
a. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit adopted the reasonable and consistent test in 1985, in
Amato v. Western Union International, Inc. 132 The court ignored all prior
Second Circuit precedents, under which revenue rulings were deemed to have
little or no weight, 133 and instead cited two opinions from the District Court
for the Southern District of New York, including Dunn,13 4 and one Seventh
135
Circuit opinion, which did not apply the reasonable and consistent standard.
The court stated: "Revenue rulings issued by the I.R.S. 'are entitled to great
deference, and have been said to "have the force of legal precedents unless
131 See, e.g., B. Forman Co. v. Commissioner, 453 F.2d 1144, 1152 (2d Cir.)
("Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with
the revenue statutes."), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 934 (1972); see also Bingler v. Johnson, 394
U.S. 741, 750 (1969); Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501
(1948); Solomon v. Commissioner, 570 F.2d 28, 32 n.4 (2d Cir. 1977).
132 773 F.2d 1402, 1411-12 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed, 474 U.S. 1113 (1986).
133 Canisius College v. United States, 799 F.2d 18, 22 n.8 (2d Cir. 1986) (a "revenue
ruling does not have the force of law and is of little aid in interpreting a tax statute"), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1014 (1987); Nico v. Commissioner, 565 F.2d 1234, 1237 n.4 (2d Cir.
1977) (revenue rulings "are of little aid in interpreting a tax statute"); Miller v.
Commissioner, 327 F.2d 846, 850-51 (2d Cir.) (a revenue ruling "does not commit the
Commissioner, the Tax Court, or this Court, to any particular interpretation of the law"),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 816 (1964); cf Julia R. & Estelle L. Found. Inc. v. C6mmissioner,
598 F.2d 755, 757 n.3 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting "with interest" a revenue ruling, which the
court concedes is not binding). But see Well v. Retirement Plan Admin. Comm., 750 F.2d
10, 12 (2d Cir. 1984) (according great weight to a revenue ruling in ERISA litigation
because of IRS's role in administering that statute).
13 4
Amao, 773 F.2d at 1411-12 (citing Fred H. McGrath & Son, Inc. v. United
States, 549 F. Supp. 491, 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Dunn, 468 F. Supp. at 993).
135 Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1979) (stating
merely that "revenue rulings are to be given weight by the court"), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
824 (1980). The weight accorded to the revenue ruling in Carle did not even reflect a
consistent position on the part of the Seventh Circuit court. See Kaiser v. United States, 262
F.2d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1958) (noting that revenue rulings "'have no more binding or legal
force than the opinion of any other lawyer'") (quoting United States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d
407, 410 (5th Cir. 1951)); cf Broadview Lumber Co. v. United States, 561 F.2d 698, 704
n.11 (7th Cir. 1977) (asserting that a court is not obliged to follow revenue rulings because
they are not binding on the court).
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unreasonable or inconsistent with the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code."'" 136 Although the Second Circuit has not always applied the reasonable
and consistent standard, 137 its most recent opinions (in 1992 and 1994)
38
resolutely follow Dunn's "force of legal precedent" status.1

b. Third Circuit
In 1993, the Third Circuit adopted the reasonable and consistent test in two
cases, but gave only "weight" (as opposed to "force of legal precedents") 139 to
141
the rulings at issue." 40 Both cases, GeisingerHealth Plan v. Commissioner
and Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.,142 ignore most of the rather substantial
precedent case law in the circuit. Indeed, the Geisingeropinion cites only one
prior Third Circuit decision, which neither states nor supports the test adopted
by the court, 143 preferring instead to cite decisions from other circuits. 14 4 The
Gillis opinion cites only Geisinger.

136 Amato, 773 F.2d at 1411 (quoting FredH. McGrath, 549 F. Supp. at 493 (quoting
Dunn, 468 F. Supp. at 993)).
137 In at least one case, the court continued to assert that a "revenue ruling does not
have the force of law and is of little aid in interpreting a tax statute." Canisius College v.
United States, 799 F.2d 18, 22 n.8 (2d Cir. 1986).
13 8 In Salomon Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 837, 841-43 (2d Cir. 1992) and
Gillespie v. United States, 23 F.3d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1994), the court regarded itself bound to
apply revenue rulings that were both reasonable and consistent with the Code. Accord
Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986).
139 Dunn v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 991, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
140 Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1145 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 1369 (1994); Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210, 1215 n.2,
1216 (3d Cir. 1993).
141 985 F.2d at 1216.
142
4 F.3d at 1145.
143 In Strick Corp. v. United States, 714 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1983), the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals described the weight of revenue rulings by comparing them to treasury
regulations, which may not be disturbed unless they are plainly contrary to the statute. Id. at
1197. Factors set forth in National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S.
472, 477 (1979) (e.g., contemporaneous issuance, length of time in effect, reliance placed
upon it, consistency of interpretation, and degree of congressional scrutiny) are considered
in determining whether a regulation comports with the statute. Id. Strick expressly
recognized, however, that "although a revenue ruling may provide some guidance, it is not
entitled to the same deference which is extended to a treasury regulation." Id. (emphasis
added); see also Commissioner v. 0. Liquidating Corp., 292 F.2d 225, 231 (3d Cir.)
(according "great weight" to a revenue ruling), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 898 (1961);
Ostheimer v. United States, 264 F.2d 789, 793 (3d Cir.) (stating that a longstanding revenue
ruling is entitled to great weight unless taxpayer can show that it is erroneous), cert. denied,
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c. Fifth Crcuit
The Fifth Circuit adopted the reasonable and consistent test in 1990.145
1 46
Previously, the court's approach to revenue rulings had been inconsistent.
The Fifth Circuit now "will disregard" 147 a ruling if it is unreasonable or
inconsistent with the statute or legislative history, and otherwise will accord
149
them "special" 148 or "respectful consideration."

361 U.S. 818 (1959). For a critique of the statutory construction doctrines of longstanding
existence and reenactment, see Galler, supranote 9, at 881-90.
144 Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1216 (citing Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84
(6th Cir. 1988); Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986);
Strick, 714 F.2d at 1197; Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir.
1979)). The court arranged its citations, including Strick, in reverse chronological order.
One would expect, however, that a prior opinion issued by the same court would be
considered more helpful or authoritative than opinions from other circuits, and therefore
would be cited first. See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 25-26
(Columbia Law Review Assoc. et al. eds., 15th ed. 1991) (Rule 1.4(d)) (recommending that
an authority be cited first if it is more helpful or authoritative than the other authorities, or if
there is some other substance-related rationale).
145 Foil v. Commissioner, 920 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1990).
146 Compare United States Trust Co. v. IRS, 803 F.2d 1363, 1370 n.9 (5th Cir. 1986)
(stating that revenue rulings are entitled to deference) and Silco, Inc. v. United States, 779
F.2d 282, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying revenue ruling because no court had addressed
the issue) and Treadco Tires, Inc. v. United States, 604 F.2d 14, 16 (5th Cir. 1979)
(according great weight to a revenue ruling) and Groves v. United States, 533 F.2d 1376,
1380 (5th Cir.) (affirming lower court's respectful consideration of a revenue ruling), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976) and Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 443 F.2d
475, 478 (5th Cir. 1971) (giving weight to a revenue ruling) and Macey's Jewelry Corp. v.
United States, 387 F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir. 1967) (stating that revenue rulings should be given
weight) with Frysinger v. Commissioner, 645 F.2d 523, 525 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that
revenue rulings are merely guidelines stating the IRS's position) and Stubbs, Overbeck &
Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (5th Cir. 1971) ("[A] ruling is
merely the opinion of a lawyer in the agency and must be accepted as such.") and United
States v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1951) (stating that rulings have no more
binding or legal force than the opinion of any other lawyer). For a comparable decision, see
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652, 657 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding that a
ruling was persuasive although it did not have the force and effect of law).
147 Foil, 920 F.2d at 1201.

148 Id.; see also Guilzon v. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 819, 822 (5th Cir. 1993).
149 Foil, 920 F.2d at 1201.
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d. Sixth Circuit
Although the Sixth Circuit first employed the reasonable and consistent test
in 1988,150 its application of that standard has been confused and erratic. The
incoherence that is evident within this court exemplifies the prevalent confusion
on the issue of judicial deference to revenue rulings and accentuates the need
for a uniform solution.
The Sixth Circuit has applied the reasonable and consistent test in several
cases, but has failed to specify the quantum of weight properly accorded to
reasonable and consistent rulings. In some instances, "some deference" has
been accorded, 151 while "great deference" or "force of legal precedents" is the
52
standard applied in another. 1
The court has not articulated how the test itself is applied. In some cases,
the court has accorded some amount of weight or deference because it found
that a revenue ruling was reasonable and consistent. 153 In another case, the
court did not use the reasonable and consistent test to accord weight, but rather
to justify disregarding a ruling that conflicted with a statute or was otherwise
unreasonable.I 54 In two cases in which the court purported to apply a Chevron
deference analysis, 155 it articulated the reasonable and consistent test without
156
explaining the relevance or role of the latter standard in the Chevron context.
e. Ninth Circuit
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the reasonable and
consistent test in 1993, awarding "great deference" 15 7 to a reasonable and
consistent ruling. The facts and issues presented in Walt Disney Inc. v.
Commissioner158 were essentially the same as those in a case decided by the
Second Circuit the year before. 159 The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of
the Second Circuit, including the standard of deference accorded to a relevant
150 Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84 (6th Cir. 1988).
151 Johnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 976 (6th Cir. 1993);
Kinnie v. United States, 994 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir. 1993); CenTra, Inc. v. United States,
1051, 1056 (6th Cir. 1992).
953 F.2d
152 Progressive Corp. v. United States, 970 F.2d 188, 194 (6th Cir. 1992).
153 K'nnie, 994 F.2d at 287; Progressive, 970 F.2d at 194.
154 Threlkeld, 848 F.2d at 84.

155 See infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
156 Johnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 977 (6th Cir. 1993);
CenTra, Inc. v. United States, 953 F.2d 1051, 1055-56 (6th Cir. 1992).
157 Walt Disney Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 F.3d 735, 740 (9th Cir. 1993).
15 8 Id. at 735.
159 Salomon Inc. v. United States, 976 F.2d 837, 83"-41 (2d Cir. 1992).
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revenue ruling. 160 Thus, the Disney court stated that "'[r]evenue rulings issued
by the I.R.S. are entitled'to great deference, and have been said to have the
force of legal precedent unless unreasonable or inconsistent with the provisions
161
of the Internal Revenue Code.'"
In applying the Second Circuit standard, the Disney court disregarded prior
precedent in the Ninth Circuit that reflected a lesser degree of deference. The
Ninth Circuit 16had generally regarded revenue rulings as entitled to
"consideration" 2 because they represent "a body of experience and informed
judgment" 163 or "indicat[e] the trend of opinion among administrators
experienced with the tax laws." 164 The court had also expressed a willingness
to accord some amount of added weight to a revenue ruling that is established,
or longstanding, and that is issued pursuant to an explicit congressional
mandate. 165
2. Deference to Administrators
Six courts of appeals at some point in time have given special treatment to
revenue rulings simply because they represent constructions of the Code by the
agency charged with the Code's administration. 166 The Courts of Appeals for
160 Walt Disney, 4 F.3d at 739-41.
161 Id. at 740 (quoting Salomon, 976 F.2d at 841).
162 Ricards v. United States, 683 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1981).
163
Rcards, 683 F.2d at 1224 n.12; accord Bolker v. Commissioner, 760 F.2d 1039,
1043 (9th Cir. 1985); Magneson v. Commissioner, 753 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1985);
Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 350 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1983).
164
Washington State Dairy Prod. Comm'n v. United States, 685 F.2d 298, 300-301
(9th Cir. 1982) (noting that revenue rulings "may be helpful in interpreting the law");
accord Schneier v. Commissioner, 735 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir. 19?4), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1190 (1985); Confederated Tribes v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878, 881 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982).
But see Idaho Power Co. v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 688, 696 n. 10 (9th Cir. 1973) (noting
that a revenue ruling "is merely the opinion of a lawyer in an agency"), rev'd, 418 U.S. 1
(1974). For a critique of deference based on agency expertise, see Galler, supra note 9, at
851-56.
165 Estate of Lang v. Commissioner, 613 F.2d 770, 776 (9th Cir. 1980); see also
Certified Stainless Servs., Inc. v. United States, 736 .F.2d 1383, 1386 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that revenue rulings "will be given considerable weight when explicating the
Commissioner's authority to implement a congressional mandate");
. Gino v.
Commissioner, 538 F.2d 833, 835 (9th Cir.) (finding the Commissioner's view persuasive
because it had been issued to solve the particular problem at issue), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
979 (1976).
166 E.g., Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833, 836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986); Wood
v. Commissioner, 955 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1992); United States Trust Co. v. IRS, 803
F.2d 1363, 1370 n.9 (5th Cir. 1986); Babin v. Commissioner, 23 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir.
1994); Anselmo v. Commissioner, 757 F.2d 1208, 1213 n.5 (11th Cir. 1985). The Court of
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the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits, however, have more recently followed
the reasonable and consistent standard. 167 The Sixth Circuit has adopted all
three deference standards (i.e., reasonable and consistent, deference to
16
administrators,and Chevron deference) during the last five years.'
Courts do not explain why the agency's administrative functions should
lead to judicial deference. Commentators have suggested generically that courts
might believe that an agency's substantive expertise is likely to produce a
correct interpretation of an ambiguous statute 169 or that policy questions arising

from statutory ambiguities should be answered by agencies, and not by the
courts. 170 Despite conjecture on the part of legal scholars, however, courts
sitting in tax controversies that involve revenue rulings have neither articulated
any reasoned basis for treating these administrative pronouncements specially,
nor explained their failure to adopt consistent practices in subsequent cases.
The IRS's expertise can be examined from two perspectives: relative to
other litigants and relative to the courts. As to the first, I believe that deference
to the IRS is not appropriate if premised upon superior skills or knowledge
possessed by agency staff members relative to private practitioners. Not only
does the tax bar include many individuals with considerable ability and
professional experience, but many of these lawyers have served as members of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has resorted to revenue rulings for guidance in the
interpretation of statutes because they "constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment," Watts, 703 F.2d at 350 n.19, and "indicat[e] the trend of opinion among
administrators
experienced with the tax laws." ConfederatedTribes, 691 F.2d at 881 n.2.
167
See supra notes 132-38, 145-49, 157-65 and accompanying text.
165
8 See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text (reasonable and consistent
standard); infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text (Chevron deference).
169 Three possible explanations for judicial deference premised upon expertise have
emerged. First, judicial deference may be warranted by the superior skills of agency staff
members, who are able to anticipate the impact or effects of statutes. See generally Colin S.
Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the AdinistrativeState, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 577-78
(1985). Second, the practical knowledge of administrators, gained from their ongoing
familiarity with regulated industries, may justify deference. See Clark Byse, JudicialReview
ofAdmninistrative Interpretationof Statutes: An Analysis of Chevron's Step Two, 2 ADMIN.
L.J. 255, 258 (1988); Scalia, supra note 81, at 514; Starr, supra note 70, at 309-10; see
also Watts v. United States, 703 F.2d 346, 350 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1983) (observing that revenue
rulings "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment"); cf Washington State
Dairy Prods. Comm'n v. United States, 685 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that
revenue rulings indicate "the trend of opinion among administrators experienced with the
tax laws"). Finally, the relationship between agency expertise and judicial deference may be
based on an agency's expert ability to educe the meaning of ambiguous statutes. See Diver,
supra at 574.
170 See, e.g., Farina, supra note 77, at 466-67; Herz, supra note 75, at 194-96;
Merrill, supranote 69, at 978; Silberman, supra note 73, at 822; Sunstein, supra note 66, at
2087-88; Braun, supranote 75, at 988-89.
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the Treasury Department and the IRS. Therefore, I cannot'conclude that the
IRS lawyers are better as a group than the private bar. As to the second
comparison, the IRS is more expert in the tax law than are judges, with the
obvious exception of Tax Court judges (and any other judges who may happen
to have substantial tax practice experience). The agency's greater proficiency in
tax law, however, should not automatically give rise to deference for the
reasons described in Part V of this Article.
Regardless of expertise, Chevron may support the notion that Congress
intended agencies, and not the courts, to make policy choices. 171 As the
nation's revenue collector, however, the IRS should be expected to construe
statutes in a light most favorable to the collection of tax dollars.1 72 Deference

171 See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
172 Note, Judidal Review of Regulations and Rulings Under the Revenue Acts, 52

HARV. L. Rnv. 1163, 1163 (1939); see also Randolph E. Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax
Regulationsin Statutory Construction, in STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION No. 3, at 420-21
(1940) ("[IThe Treasury Department has the function of collecting revenue, and it would
therefore be expecting too much of human nature that its executive constructions of the
statutes should invariably maintain a studious impartiality."); Gary L. Rodgers, The
Commissioner "DoesNot Acquiesce", 59 NEB. L. REV. 1001, 1024-25 (1980) (describing
the IRS's role as "more closely analogous to that of a contestant than that of a[n] impartial
arbiter"); Silberman, supra note 73, at 823 (observing that as it has become obvious that
administrative agencies do not exercise neutral expertise, "the doctrine of deference based
on agency expertise... [has become] a good deal less satisfactory"); cf Estate of Clayton
v. Commissioner, 976 F.2d 1486, 1499 (5th Cir. 1992) (accusing the IRS of
"overzealousness in revenue collection," "deliberate disregard for the clear purpose, intent
and policy behind the statute," and "overreaching").
The same issue arises with respect to the EPA in its role as enforcer of the nation's
Superfund laws. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (CERCLA). The EPA is
seeking a legislative amendment that would give the agency authority "to issue rules to
clarify or interpret" CERCLA's lender liability scheme. The Superfund Reform Act of
1995, H.R. 228, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 407 (amending CERCLA § 115); see also The
Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 407. Professor Craig
Johnston has argued that because the EPA acts as an enforcer in CERCLA actions in which
the liability scheme is at issue, "provid[ing] EPA with interpretive authority would be akin
to providing criminal prosecutors (as opposed to the courts) with the ultimate authority to
interpret the enforcement provisions they implement." Craig N. Johnston, Who Decides
Who's Liable Under CERCLA?: EPA Slips a Bombshell into the CERCLA Reauthorization
Process, 24 ENvTL. L. 1045, 1046-48 (1994).
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in these circumstances deprives taxpayers of an opportunity to convince a
neutral arbiter that the government's position is wrong.
3. Chevron Deference
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit court to have
applied Chevron in the context of IRS revenue rulings, but it has not embraced
C revron as controlling precedent. Although the court followed Chevron in two
recent cases, CenTra, Inc. v. United States,173 and Johnson City Medical
Center v. United States, 174 the Johnson City bench divided sharply on the
applicability of Chevron to revenue rulings. Moreover, in several other
contemporaneous cases in which Chevron deference principles might have
applied, the Sixth Circuit instead used a variety of incompatible approaches.
The court has never offered an explanation of these inconsistencies.
In CenTra, an IRS interpretation was set forth in a Treasury regulation
and an IRS revenue ruling, which the court read together. 175 The court
addressed Chevron, however, only as to the revenue ruling. Rather than
concluding that the revenue ruling was reasonable and then applying it (which
are the required actions after answering the threshold question under Chevron's
two-step analysis),' 7 6 the court discussed pre-Chevron authorities and described
the amount of deference accorded to revenue rulings variously as "'some

Johnston also contends that:
[ulnder the... bill, EPA would replace the judiciary as the primary interpreter of
CERCLA's liability scheme. As such, it would be able to resolve every ambiguity in
the liability scheme in its favor so long as its interpretations pass Chevron muster. Its
lawyers would be remiss if they did not advise their client to use this authority liberally.

la at 1051.
173 953 F.2d 1051 (6th Cir. 1992).
174 999 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1993). The lower court in Johnson City also applied
Chevron because it regarded itself precedentially bound by the Sixth Circuit's opinion in
CenTra. Johnson City Medical Ctr. Hosp. v. United States, 783 F. Supp. 1048, 1051-52
(E.D. Tenn. 1992), aff'd, 999 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1993).
175 The CenTra opinion placed great significance on a "unified reading" of a Treasury
regulation and a revenue ruling. CenTra, 953 F.2d at 1055; see also id. at 1054 (referring
to a "unified and consistent" interpretation). In Unisys Corp. v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl.
552 (Ct. Fed. Cl.), qft'd, 39 F.3d 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1994), the Court of Federal Claims

intimated that a Treasury regulation and consistent revenue ruling, when read together,
establish a "unified agency interpretation," which merits deference under CenTra. Id. at
564.
176 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
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177 "'some weight,'"' 78 "'respectful consideration,'"' 179 and
deference,'"'180
"'weight.'"' These standards simply are not relevant where Chevron applies.
The Chevron analysis in Johnson City is flawed in much the same way as
the CenTra opinion. After finding that the statute at issue was ambiguous
(Chevron step one), the court went on to determine whether the agency's
interpretation was permissible, or reasonable (Chevron step two). A finding of
reasonableness should have ended the matter, as the court was then required to
follow the agency's interpretation. The court instead quoted CenTra for the
proposition that "some deference" is applied unless the revenue ruling is
inconsistent with the statute or its legislative history, or is otherwise
unreasonable. 181 Finding that the taxpayer had not levied a plausible argument
that the revenue ruling conflicted with the statute or its legislative history, or
was unreasonable, the court followed the revenue ruling.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Batchelder argued that Chevron does not
apply to revenue rulings because they are issued without APA notice and
comment.182 Revenue rulings instead should be analyzed under standards of
deference that traditionally (i.e., pre-Chevron) applied to interpretive rules or
regulations. 183 Under Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,184 the weight of a revenue
ruling would depend "'upon the thoroughness evident in the [IRS's]
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade.'"' 185
After considering a number of factors, including "the importance of agency
expertise, contemporaneity of the interpretation with enactment of the statute,
longstanding application and consistency of the agency interpretation, the
possibility of congressional acquiescence, and numerous others," 186 the judge
concluded that the ruling at issue in Johnson Cty was not entitled to deference.

177 CenTra, 953 F.2d at 1056 (quoting Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 848 F.2d 81, 84
(6th Cir. 1988)).
178 CenTra, 953 F.2d at 1056 (quoting Brook, Inc. v. Commissioner, 799 F.2d 833,
836 n.4 (2d Cir. 1986)).
179 CenTra, 953 F.2d at 1056 (quoting Foil v. Commissioner, 920 F.2d 1196, 1201

(5th Cir. 1990)).

180 CenTra, 953 F.2d at 1056 (quoting Foil, 920 F.2d at 1201).

181 Johnson City Medical Ctr. v. United States, 999 F.2d 973, 976 (6th Cir. 1993).
182 Id. at 978-84 (Batchelder, I., dissenting).
183 Id. at 980-84; see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
184 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
185 Johnson City, 999 F.2d at 981 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
186 Johnson City, 999 F.2d at 981 (quoting Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency

InterpretationsShould Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE I. ON REG. 1, 13-14 (1990)
[hereinafter Agency Interpretations)).
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Judge Batchelder's deference standard has never been applied to revenue
rulings by the Sixth Circuit.
Since the CenTra decision in 1992, the Sixth Circuit has addressed the
issue of deference to revenue rulings in five cases (excluding Johnson City).
The court's approach has varied, but Chevron has not been applied. For
187
example, the court has regarded a ruling merely as the IRS's position,
applied the reasonable and consistent test to accord "great deference" or "force
of legal precedents," 188 given "some deference" to a ruling that was reasonable
and consistent and expressed the studied view of administrators, 189 described
revenue rulings as "persuasive authority," 190 and stated that rulings are entitled
to "some deference" as the studied view of the IRS. 191 Curiously, three of the
five opinions were written by Judge Milburn, the author of the court's opinion
in CenTra.192 The application of different deference standards and the obvious
division within the court on applicability of Chevron make it difficult to predict
the level of judicial scrutiny that this court will accord to revenue rulings in
future cases.
C. Supreme Court
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on the weight of revenue
rulings, the Court has acknowledged their ambiguous status. In United States v.
Thompson/CenterArms Co. 193 the government urged the Court to defer to two
revenue rulings, but the Court reached its decision without addressing the
weight of the rulings. In a footnote, the Court stated, "[e]ven if they were
entitled to deference, neither of the rulings ... goes to the narrow question
94

presented here." 1
Longstanding revenue rulings apparently do merit consideration. In Davis
v. United States,195 the Court gave "considerable weight" to a revenue ruling
that was issued contemporaneously with the statute that it construed and that
197
had been in long use. 196 In Cottage Savings Association v. Commissioner,
187

Disabled Am. Veterans v. Commissioner, 942 F.2d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 1991).
188 Progressive Corp. v. United States, 970 F.2d 188, 194 (6th Cir. 1992).
189 Kinnie v. United States, 994 F.2d 279, 286 (6th Cir. 1993).
190 Constantino v. TRW, Inc., 13 F.3d 969, 981 (6th Cir. 1994).
191 Babin v. Commissioner, 23 F.3d 1032, 1038 (6th Cir. 1994).
192
Id. at 1033; Kinnie, 994 F.2d at 280; Progressive,970 F.2d at 189.
193 504 U.S. 505 (1992).
194 Id. at 518 n.9 (emphasis added).
195
495 U.S. 472 (1990).
196
Id. at 484. The ruling also had survived reenactment of the statute. Id. at 482. The
Davis deference standard is analyzed and criticized in Galler, supra note 9.

197 499 U.S. 554 (1991).
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the Commissioner did not argue for deference to two of her revenue rulings.
The Court expressly noted the Commissioner's omission and speculated that
she had not raised the issue because the rulings were issued after the
transactions at issue and did not purport to define the precise regulatory
language at issue before the court. 198 The Court then cited National Muffler
DealersAssociation, Inc. v. United States,19 9 in which the Court deferred to a
position reflected in a longstanding series of revenue rulings that consistently
adhered to the same position in a variety of fact patterns. 2°°
The Court did not explain in Davis or Cottage Savings why "longstanding"
is a significant factor in characterizing the weight of a revenue ruling. 201 The
Supreme Court's failure to articulate a deference standard exacerbates the
confusion among the lower courts as to the status of revenue rulings.
IV. RECONCILING THE DIVERGENT APPROACHES

Regardless of the particular approach or methodology adopted by a court
of appeals, it is clear that the federal courts, as a group, are moving away from
independent analyses of IRS positions where there are revenue rulings. These
courts seem to want to defer and are actively and deliberately searching for an
acceptable basis on which to premise their deferential stance. It is notable in
this regard that prior precedents of a deciding court are not faithfully adhered
to while other courts' positions are enthusiastically embraced. Moreover, the
Tax Court's opinions are never a source of authority for deference standards.
This is particularly interesting in light of the high regard customarily afforded
the Tax Court because of its proficiency and consequent ability to influence
jurisprudence in the generalist courts. 202
198 Id. at 563 n.7.

199 440 U.S. 472, 483-84 & nn.16-19 (1979).
200 The Court also cited Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965), a non-tax case
in which an agency's reasonable interpretation of its own regulations was entitled to

deference.
201 In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984), the Court endorsed an agency's license to change its position. The EPA had
changed its construction of the governing statute and the plaintiff argued that the EPA's

interpretation was not worthy of deference because of the change. Id. at 840. The Court
stated: "An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On the contrary, the
agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and the
wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis." Id. at 863-64; see also Starr, supra note 70, at
297; Sunstein, supra note 66, at 2102-04. See generally Galler, supra note 9, at 881-86.
202 A study conducted by the Virginia Tax Review found that, between January 1,
1983 and December 31, 1987, the circuit courts affirmed approximately 73 % of Tax Court

decisions, while district court tax decisions were affirmed approximately 60% of the time.
Special Project, An Empirical Study of the Intercircuit Conflicts on Federal Income Tax
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This section will attempt to explain why the federal courts are moving
away from the Tax Court in favor of greater deference to agency positions. I
believe that the deviations flow directly from the most obvious difference
between the courts, namely the generalist character of the federal courts versus
the specialized nature of the Tax Court.
A. Tax Court
The judges of the Tax Court may be unwilling to summarily accept an IRS
position because the judges regard themselves as capable of analyzing statutory
ambiguities and related policy considerations, and see no reason to rely on
someone else's analysis. Tax Court judges, after all, are experts in tax law, and
have both the ability and propensity to develop a deep understanding of tax
law20 3 and to devote their efforts to hearing and considering complex tax

issues.204 The judges are appointed from among the ranks of tax specialists20 5
and their dockets consist solely of cases involving tax controversies. 2°6 Thus,
Issues, 9 VA. TAx REv. 125, 140-41 (1989). The report suggests that "[d]eference and lack
of expertise lead the circuits to affirm the Tax Court." Id. at 132. An earlier study covering
fiscal years 1967 through 1970 reached similar conclusions. K. Martin Worthy, The Tax
litigation Structure, 5 GA. L. Rnv. 248, 253 (1971); cf. Rochelle Coper Dreyfuss,
Specialized Adjutication, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 377, 380 (observing that where generalist
and specialized courts share jurisdiction over similar matters, generalist courts tend to defer
to the expertise of the specialized bench).
203 See Dreyfuss, supranote 202, at 378.
204 Crimm, supra note 8, at 74; Worthy, supra note 202, at 250; cf S. Jay Plager,
The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Crcuit, and the Non-Regional Subject
Matter Concept:Reflections on the Searchfor a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 853, 859 (1990)
(asserting that judges who serve on specialized courts "may treat the merits of each case
with greater care and understanding" than judges who serve on generalist benches).
Professor Crimm also notes that fewer time constraints are imposed in the Tax Court than in
district courts, and the Chief Judge may appoint special trial judges in time-consuming or
factually complex cases. Thus, both the judge and the attorney/advisor are able to give
considerable attention and thoughtful analysis to these cases. Crimm, supra note 8, at 8182.
205 The Tax Court consists of 19 members, or judges, who are appointed by the
President for terms of 15 years. I.R.C. § 7443 (1988). In addition, the Chief Judge may
appoint special trial judges. I.R.C. § 7443A (1988). Of the 17 regular judges who are
currently members of the Tax Court, 12 previously served as government tax attorneys (m
the Treasury Department or IRS, or as congressional staffers), and 11 practiced tax law in
the private sector. See 15 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCII) 42,751 (June 23, 1994).
206 The Tax Court's primary function is to redetermine the correct amount of
deficiencies initially determined by the IRS. I.R.C. § 6214(a) (1988). For general
descriptions of the Tax Court's jurisdiction, see 4 BomS I. Brri7ER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN,
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their substantial expertise is acquired before and after appointment to the court.
Attorney/advisors who work in the court also have specialized knowledge and
training.

Tax Court judges are well briefed on the issues presented in each case. Tax
Court Rule 151 requires the filing of post-trial briefs and reply briefs, unless a
presiding judge directs the parties otherwise. 20 7 The briefs highlight the areas
of controversy and the requirement of a reply brief ensures that arguments will
receive a response. In addition to legal arguments, briefs filed by both parties
must include proposed findings of facts, and reply briefs must set out and
20 8
explain objections to proposed findings submitted by an opponent.
Tax Court procedures regarding issuance and review of opinions2 °9 offer
judges the opportunity to discuss proposed findings and conclusions with
colleagues, assuring "the most complete and deliberate consideration of
important questions." 2 10 Indeed, former Chief Judge Nims has asserted that the
Tax Court's review system is unlike that of any other federal court except the
211
Supreme Court.

The Chief Judge reviews all opinions before they are finalized. 212 This

review ensures that each proposed opinion is consistent with other opinions
FEDmAL TAXATION OF NCOMNE, ESTATES AND GFrs 115.2 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995);
NINA2J.07CRIMM, TAX COURT LrriGATION 2.2 (1993 & Supp. 1994).
TAX CT. R. PRAc. & PROc. 151(a), (b) (For the official reprint of these rules, see
94 T.C. 821, 821-1115 (1990). For a more recent version with current amendments, see
CRrMM,supranote 206, app. A at A-11 to A-184). A judge may permit or direct the parties
to make oral argument or file memoranda or statements of authorities, in lieu of or in
addition
to briefs. Id.
20
8TAXCT. R. PRAC. & PROc. 151(e).
209 Judges are required to file a report with respect to each case in which a decision is
rendered, I.R.C. § 7459(a) (1988), consisting of findings of fact and an opinion or
memorandum opinion stating the judge's legal conclusions. LR.C. § 7459(b). A decision is
based on the report. I.R.C. § 7459(a). Insmall tax cases, a decision and brief summary of
the underlying reasons satisfy the report requirement. I.R.C. § 7463(a). In all cases, the
presiding judge may render a report orally on the record if the judge "is satisfied as to the
factual conclusions to be reached in the case and that the law to be applied thereto is clear."
TAX CT. R. PRAc. & PRoc. 152(a); see also LR.C. § 7459(b) (providing for oral reports in
small tax cases).
210 Worthy, supra note 202, at 252.
211 Judge Arthur L. Nims, III, Statement Before the Federal Courts Study Committee
(ian. 31, 1990), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, search term 90 TNT 26-18
[hereinafter Testimony of Judge Arthur Nims].
2 12
I.R.C. § 7460(b). The Chief Judge or a regular Tax Court judge reviews summary
opinions in small tax cases. TAX CT. R. PRAC. & PRoc. 182(a). The entire court does not
review oral reports because they tend to be issued in cases involving uncomplicated facts
and legal principles. CRIMM, supra note 206, at 10.2[2][c][ii].
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issued by the Tax Court.2 13 The Chief Judge may decide to issue an opinion as
written, 2 14 suggest modifications to the language in an opinion or to the

conclusions reached, 215 or submit the opinion for consideration by the entire
court.

2 16

The full court meets in conference to dispose of opinions referred by the
Chief Judge. 2 17 Prior to the conference, proposed opinions are circulated and

judges informally discuss the issues presented. 218 Drafts of dissenting or
concurring opinions also may be circulated. 219 If an opinion is not adopted by
the conference, the original judge may elect to rewrite the opinion or request
that the case be reassigned. 220 In either situation, the full court reviews the
22 1
rewritten opinion under the same procedures as the original opinion.
B. FederalCourts
Generalist judges may be more willing to accept IRS revenue ruling
positions simply because they prefer to leave tax cases alone. Professor Paul
Caron has used the phrase "tax myopia" to describe the tendency of judges,
lawyers, and law professors to regard tax law as a self-contained body of law

2 13

Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., Tax Court Trials:An Updated View from the Bench, 47
TAX LAW. 587, 600 (1994).
214 A proposed opinion becomes final after 30 days unless the Chief Judge directs a
full court review. LR.C. § 7460(b).
215 Testimony of Judge Arthur Nims, supra note 211.

216 LR.C. § 7460(b). The Chief Judge must decide within 30 days whether to adopt
the opinion as written or refer it to the entire court. Id. Judge Tannenwald has suggested

that the following factors may influence, but need not control, the Chief Judge's decision to
direct full court review:
The case may be one of first impression. It may involve a factual pattern of
widespread interest because of the probability of recurrence. The trial judge may be
proposing to declare a regulation invalid or to overrule a prior Tax Court decision; he
may be refusing to follow a Court of Appeals decision; he may be distinguishing district
court or prior Tax Court decisions on a basis the Chief Judge considers doubtful; or the
Chief Judge may question the validity of the legal approach the trial judge has adopted.

Tannenwald, supranote 213, at 600 (citations omitted); see also Testimony of Judge Arthur
Nins, supra note 211.
217 I.R.C. § 7460(b).
2 18

Id.
Tannenwald, supra note 213, at 600-01.
220 Id.
2 19

221 Id. Absentee judges are permitted to participate and vote. Id.
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that is somehow different from other areas. 222 One might extrapolate from
these observations that judges who are not tax specialists are more likely to
leave the resolution of tax questions to others. Indeed, one need only recall
Judge Learned Hand's celebrated commentary to understand that this
conviction is shared even by eminent jurists:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for example,
merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-reference to
cross-reference, exception upon exception-couched in abstract terms that offer
no handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind only a confused sense of some
vitally important, but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty to
extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only after the most ordinate
expenditure of time.

223

Professor Harold Bruff postulates that courts of appeals tend to defer heavily to
224
the Tax Court because they are daunted by the complexity of the Code.
The Supreme Court apparently shares these views. Based on interviews
with Supreme Court Justices and former clerks, Professor H.W. Perry
concludes that the Court denies many petitions for certiorari in tax cases
because some Justices believe that the issues are too complex to justify the
222 Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don'tLet Your Babies Grow Up to be Tax
Layers, 13 VA. TAX REv. 517, 518 (1994). Professor Caron's article also documents the
perception that tax lawyers are different from other lawyers. He ultimately concludes that
these misperceptions have impaired the development of both tax law and other fields by
isolating the debates in the tax area from those in other fields. Id.
223 Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J 167, 169 (1947); see also
Martin D. Ginsburg, The Federal Courts Study Conmmittee on Caims Court Tax
Jurisdiction,40 CATH. U. L. REV. 631, 635 (1991) ("Generalist judges live in mortal fear
of tax cases, and rightly so."); L Andrew Hoerner, Peterson Blasts Proposalfor National
Court of Tax Appeals, 46 TAX NOTES 1256, 1256 (1990) (referring to a "pervasive attitude
that, 'Tax law is a special form of witchcraft and should be left to the witch doctors, and
that other mortals should not mess around with it, because of the danger that, like the
sorcerer's apprentice, they might flood the workshop.'" (quoting M. Carr Ferguson, Jr.'s
remarks at the Federal Bar Association Section of Taxation's 14th Annual Tax Law
Conference on Mar. 2, 1990)).
2 24
Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV.
329, 337 (1991). Professor Bruff advocates the creation of an Article I Administrative
Court, which would have initial review jurisdiction over selected programs and whose
factual findings would, in some circumstances, be nonreviewable. The court would be semispecialized, since it would have jurisdiction over a number of subjects. Tax cases, however,
would be treated separately, as they would be presided over by a designated group of
specialist judges who likely would move from the present Tax Court into the Administrative
Court. Bruff asserts that special treatment of tax cases is justified by the complexity of tax
law. Id. at 363-66.
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Court's time and effort and that it is better to leave the questions to tax
specialists. 225 Although all of the Justices interviewed did not agree, an

226
"overwhelming number" of the clerks did.
The complexity of the tax laws implies that it may be wasteful of resources
(namely time) for generalist judges to educate themselves on the intricacies of
the issues presented. 227 When faced with a complicated tax question, a judge
might defer to administrative expertise either as a means of avoiding the need
to familiarize herself altogether with the issues presented, or as a means of
corroborating her own conclusions. In the tax area in particular, many cases
cannot be adequately resolved without both an understanding of the Code
section at issue and an appreciation of its relationship to other provisions and

2 25

H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 229-30 (1991). Two clerks are quoted as follows:
[CLERK #1:] Justice
thinks that the Court just should never deal with tax
cases. Tax cases ought to be left to the more specialized courts that can deal with them.
The Supreme Court isn't that competent unless it deals with a constitutional issue

[implicated in a tax issue], or maybe if there is just a complete breakdown with a split in

the circuits. But if it is purely an issue of interpretation of a tax statute, he just thinks
that the Supreme Court ought not to deal with it.
[CLERK #2:] No one wanted tax or patent cases. They are technically very difficult.
The Court really doesn't have the expertise developed to deal with them. They wouldn't

grant them unless there was just a clear split in the circuits, and we clerks were
essentially instructed to work very hard to show why in fact there was no split in

circuits.
Id. at229.
226 Id.
227 . Michael I. Saltzman, Should 7here Be a National Court of Tax Appeals?, 8
A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N NEWSL. 61, 77 (1989) (noting that the appellate caseload makes it "both
unlikely and counterproductive" for appellate judges to inform themselves about the issues
presented in tax appeals). In Dewees v. Commissioner, 870 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1989), the
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed a Tax Court decision that characterized as
shams certain "straddle" transactions. The Tax Court had consolidated for trial and
disposition over 1,000 cases presenting the same issue, and six courts of appeals had been
called upon to decide appeals from the same decision. In a concurring opinion, Judge
Brown stated: "Without disparaging counsel in this nationwide effort, this is a colossal
waste, a squandering, of precious judicial energy of at least 18 to 21 Judges at a time in
which there is great concern over the capacity of the Federal Appellate System to handle the
ever-growing caseload." Id. at 36 (Brown, J., concurring).
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concepts. 228 The more intricate the issue, the more time it will take to parse
through the law. Judges might choose simply not to do it. 229
Without expertise, generalist judges may not appreciate the nuances of an
issue, or they may not see an issue at all.23 0 This could result in a narrow
approach and also could lead judges to accept IRS positions without
appreciating the subtleties inherent in the positions of both sides.
Federal court judges are less likely than Tax Court judges to be thoroughly
briefed on issues presented in tax litigation. In contrast to the Tax Court, there
are no mandatory policies in federal district courts for the filing of briefs.
Judges may ask counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law23 1 and frequently do so, particularly in cases involving complex facts or
legal issues. 23 2 Judges, however, are not required to request these submissions,
nor are litigants bound to submit them. If a judge does not request the parties to
make submissions, there may be no opportunity to present written arguments.
Local court rules might constrain counsel's ability to make timely and
effective arguments. The FederalRules of Ovil Procedure permit individual

district courts to adopt their own rules regarding submissions. 23 3 Some courts
228 Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U. L. Rnv. 745, 747
(1981).
229 Inaddition, the more intricate the law, the more likely it is that a generalist judge
will get things wrong. Dreyfuss, supra note 202, at 409. Professor Dreyfuss suggests that
transferring complex cases to specialized courts will improve the quality of decisions,
reduce the size of the dockets in federal courts, and decrease the number of judge-hours
required to clear the docket. Id.
2 30
Plager, supra note 204, at 859 (stating that "[j]udges confronted with large and
highly diverse caseloads may tend to stereotype the cases, seeing little of the variation
within rather than across subject matter"); see also Dreyfuss, supra note 202, at 378; c.
RICHARD A. PosNER, THE FEDERAL COURTs: CmsS AND REFORM 157 (1985) (suggesting
that a generalist judge sitting in a tax case "does not look beyond the particular subsections
of the Internal Revenue Code that the parties cite to him and thus never understands the
statutory design"). Specialist judges may be able to compensate for deficiencies in briefing
or argumentation in a way that generalists cannot. Id.
231 United States v. Cornish, 348 F.2d 175, 181 n.8 (9th Cir. 1965); Featherstone v.
Barash, 345 F.2d 246, 251 (10th Cir. 1965).
23 2
Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279, 1282 (10th Cir. 1972) (action by
Secretary of Labor to enjoin Fair Labor Standards Act violations and withholding of unpaid
wages); Louis Dreyfus & Cie. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 733, 737-38 (5th Cir. 1962)
(shipowner's action for damages allegedly sustained while ship was navigated by a pilot
employed by defendant); United States v. Livingstone, 381 F. Supp. 607, 610 (D. Mass.
1974) (action for recovery of unpaid income taxes, penalties, and interest).
233 F9D. R. Civ. P. 83 states in relevant part: "Each district court by action of a
majority of the judges thereof may from time to time, after giving appropriate public notice
and an opportunity to comment, make and amend rules governing its practice not
inconsistent with these rules." Individual judges adopt rules and procedures for litigation
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are quite precise as to the format and content of documents that may be
23 4
submitted, and these rules might preclude full presentation of the issues.
In the federal courts, there are no provisions for centralized review, and
thus a judge who is not a tax specialist is on his or her own. One might surmise
that such judges might be more likely to defer to the IRS than to rule on issues
with which they are not totally comfortable.

Finally, federal judges might defer to IRS revenue ruling positions as a
means of deciding cases quickly, thereby reducing their caseloads. Much has
been written about overcrowded dockets in the federal courts, 23 5 and deference
conducted in their courtrooms, and practices vary from judge to judge. See Myron J.
Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, IndividualJudges' Practices:An Inadvertent Subversion of
the Federal Rules of avil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1994). Indeed, each
Tuesday the New York Law Journal dedicates several columns to the publication of motion
practice rules issued by individual judges.
234 A striking example of differing practices regarding proposed findings of fact is
presented in articles written by two eminent trial judges. Judge Robert Keeton of
Massachusetts requires the party with the burden of proof to file proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law at least six weeks prior to the trial date. Robert E. Keeton, The
Function of Local Rules and the Tension with Uniformity, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 853, 895
(1989). He admonishes counsel "to be concise and to propose only the findings and
conclusions that are essential to a claim or defense .... ." Id. In multi-party litigation, he
urges counsel to serve proposals jointly. Id. Counsel receiving proposed findings and
conclusions must then file a response that is marked (as per the judge's detailed instructions
regarding underlining and bracketing) to reflect items that are contested, and may file
additional findings and conclusions. Id. Such additional findings and conclusions in turn
trigger an obligation on the first party to respond. Id.
Judge Charles Richey of the District of Columbia reported in 1976 that he requires all
parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law at least 15 days before trial.
Charles R. Richey, A FederalJudge's Refiections on the Preparationfor and Trial of Cvil
Cases, 52 IND. LJ. 111, 119 (1976). Upon receipt, counsel must underline in red the
disputed portions, underline in blue those portions that are admitted, and underline in yellow
non-disputed portions that counsel deems irrelevant. Id. The parties should be prepared to
exchange supplemental findings and conclusions during the course of the trial. Id. at 120.
Although proposed findings of fact or conclusions of law may be skillfully drafted in a
manner that brings out a party's arguments, such an indirect method of argumentation is
likely to be less effective than a conventional, straightforward legal discussion that is typical
in briefs. But cf. Statement of Judge Richard W. Goldberg, Tenth Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205,
395 (1992) (indicating that he does not require post-trial briefs because they are "an
unnecessary expense and continuation of time").
235 See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 230. In 1988, at the direction of Congress, Chief
Justice Rehnquist appointed a 15-member committee to study the problems of the federal
courts. The Committee report begins by describing the "mounting public and professional
concern with the federal courts' congestion, delay, expense, and expansion." JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrIED STATES, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEE
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could be a byproduct of caseload management. When courts defer to agencies,
cases are disposed of quickly, without expending scarce resources on legal
research and analysis and drafting of lengthy opinions. 236 Moreover, the
practice of deferring also might deter others from filing suit.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF DiVERGENT APPROACHES
A. ProceduralChoices Detennine Substantive Outcome
1. Choice of Forn
Where a contested issue is addressed in an IRS revenue ruling, the
taxpayer's likelihood of success in litigation may depend largely upon the
court's treatment of such rulings. Because deference standards vary markedly
among the circuits (and sometimes within circuits), taxpayers and their counsel
must carefully review court practices before selecting a forum. Unfortunately,
prior decisions of any particular court may be of limited value in predicting
both trial and appellate court behavior because the circuit courts do not
faithfully follow their own precedents. Although few courts are as generous as
the Tax Court in offering the taxpayer consideration of the underlying issues on
their merits, success in that tribunal of course depends on the court's analysis
of the substantive issues presented.
3, 4-9 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL COURTS REPORT]. A more recent report
prepared for the Judicial Conference states that annual civil case filings increased 1,424%
between 1904 and 1994, with most of that growth occurring since 1960. JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNrrED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE

PLANNING 7 (Nov. 1, 1994). Annual cases commenced in the federal appeals courts
increased 3,868% during the same period. Id.
Justice Scalia has advocated greater specialization among courts as a means of
removing routine and relatively unimportant cases from the federal courts. Justice Antonin

Scalia, Remarks Before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National
Conference of Bar Presidents 9-10 (Feb. 15, 1987), reprinted in Scalia Wants to Preserve
Elite FederalCourts, 133 Cm. DAILY L.B., Mar. 5, 1987, at 2, 4 [hereinafter Remarks of
Justice Antonin Scalia].
236 q. POSNER, supra note 230, at 137 (arguing that caseload pressures impair the
quality of court decisions); Bruff, supra note 224, at 330 (noting that judges decide many
cases in a summary manner, e.g., without argument or opinion, and delegate many tasks to

support personnel in order to compensate for increasing caseloads). Judge Posner also
suggests that one method of increasing judicial specialization, as a means of reducing
caseload pressures in the federal appellate courts, "would be simply to reduce the scope of
judicial review of agency action." POSNER, supra note 230, at 148-49. He explains that the

narrower the scope of review in the courts of appeals, the greater the role of the specialized
judiciary relative to the generalist judiciary. Id.
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In some judicial circuits, it now is the law (in fact or in practice) that courts
must abide by revenue rulings that are reasonable and consistent with the
statute.23 7 Thus, in cases where a revenue ruling addresses the relevant issue or
issues, the taxpayer is almost certain to lose. In judicial circuits that require
courts to give revenue rulings more weight than a litigating taxpayer's
arguments, the taxpayer also is likely to lose. Only the Tax Court, 23 8 which
accords no special treatment to revenue rulings, 23 9 offers an opportunity for
full consideration of taxpayer arguments. In practical terms, then, the standard
of review applied to revenue rulings must govern the litigant's choice of forum,
and this procedural choice ultimately may determine the substantive outcome of
the case.
2. Treatment on Appeal
Appellate resolution of tax controversies should be the same whether a case
originates in the Tax Court or in a federal district court. This is because Tax
Court and district court decisions are appealed to the same appellate tribunals,
namely the eleven regional courts of appeals and, occasionally, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 240 The courts of appeals are thought to
237 See supra notes 129-65 and accompanying text (reasonable and consistent
deference standard), and notes 173-92 and accompanying text (Chevron deference).

238 Some courts of appeals, like the First Circuit, have not adopted definitive standards
or guidelines. In courts within these jurisdictions, taxpayers may still have a chance of
prevailing.
239 See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
240 I.R.C. § 7482(a)(1) (1988). Venue rules are as follows:
1. For taxpayers other than corporations, appeals in deficiency cases must be made to

the court of appeals for the circuit in which the taxpayer resides. I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(A).
2. For corporations, appeals in deficiency cases must be made to the circuit in which
the corporation's principal place of business or principal office or agency is located. If the
corporation has no principal place of business or principal office or agency in any judicial

circuit, then appellate venue is in the circuit in which the corporation files its tax return.
I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(B).
3. For partnerships, appeals in actions brought under I.R.C. § 6226 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) or I.R.C. § 6228(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (partnership administrative adjustments)
must be made to the circuit in which the partnership's principal place of business is located.

I.R.C. § 7482(b)(1)(E) (1988).
4. Appeals in declaratory judgment actions under LR.C. § 7476 (qualification of
retirement plans) must be made to the circuit in which the employer's principal place of

business or principal office or agency is located. LR.C. § 7482(b)(1)(C).
5. Appeals in declaratory judgment actions under I.R.C. § 7428 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (status and classification of organizations claiming to be tax exempt) must be made to

the circuit in which the organization's principal office or agency is located. I.R.C.
§ 7482(b)(1)(D) (1988).
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"defer heavily" 241 to the Tax Court's expertise, 242 however, with the possible
(or perhaps likely) result that a taxpayer's chance of prevailing on appeal is
better where a case originated-and where the taxpayer won-in the Tax Court.
Choice of forum at the trial level, then, may predict the outcome at the
appellate level as well.
It is difficult to measure empirically the impact of the appellate courts'
deference to the Tax Court in revenue ruling cases because cases typically are
resolved on multiple grounds, with the revenue ruling representing only one
factor taken into account by a deciding court. For example, in Ricards v.
United States,243 the appellate court's conclusion that IRS revenue rulings were
"entitled to consideration" was one of three distinct reasons for affirming a
lower court decision in favor of the government. 244 Moreover, one of the
opinions might not address a relevant revenue ruling at all. The Ninth Circuit
opinion in Walt Disney Inc. v. Commissioner,245 dealt almost exclusively with
a revenue ruling (e.g., applicability of the ruling to the facts of the case, the
appropriate deference standard, and application of that standard to the ruling at

If none of the above apply, then appeals must be made to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. I.R.C. § 7482(b). The parties may, however, agree to seek review by
any federal court of appeals. I.R.C. § 7482(b)(2). Appeals in declaratory judgment actions
under I.R.C. § 7478 (status of governmental debt obligations) may be reviewed only by the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. I.R.C. § 7482(b)(3).
Appeals from the Court of Federal Claims are made to the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
241 Bruff, supra note 224, at 337; cf Dreyfiss, supra note 202, at 380 (arguing that
generalist courts tend to defer to specialized courts). The fact of considerable deference to
the Tax Court lends further support to the argument made earlier that federal court judges
are searching for a way to defer rather than deciding each case on its individual merits. See
supratext accompanying notes 222-36.
242 The Virginia Tax Review reported in 1989 that during the five year period
commencing January 1, 1983 and ending December 31, 1987, the courts of appeals
affirmed the Tax Court in 73 % of the cases appealed and affirmed the district courts (in tax
cases) in only 60%. Special Project, supra note 202, at 140-41. The Tax Court was
reversed in 19% of the cases, compared with 30% of district court tax cases. Id. The
remaining cases (8% of Tax Court cases and 10% of district court cases) were affirmed in
part and reversed in part. Id.
243 683 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1981).
244
Id. at 1224. First, the court found that the language of the controlling statute was
unequivocal, and supported the Government's position. Id. at 1223-24. Second, the court
found that the taxpayer's arguments were inconsistent with IRS revenue rulings, which the
court regarded as "entitled to consideration." Id. at 1224. Third, the court dismissed the
taxpayer's argument that the statute at issue denied her equal protection of the laws. Id. at
1224-26.
245 4 F.3d 735 (9th Cir. 1993).
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issue). The court based its reversal squarely on the issue of deference. The Tax
246
Court opinion, however, never mentioned the ruling.

If the phenomenon of greater deference to the Tax Court does exist in
revenue ruling cases, it may well exacerbate the confusion among the circuit
courts regarding the status of revenue rulings. One need only imagine the
following scenario to see the absurdity of the situation: an appellate court

defers to the Tax Court (which in turn does not defer to revenue rulings) but
does not defer to district courts (which do defer to revenue rulings). Of course,
the situation gets worse when one remembers that the circuits do not follow the
same standards.
The latter half of the hypothetical scenario-non-deference to a deferring
district court-may seem unlikely to occur as most courts of appeals themselves
are apt to defer to revenue rulings and, therefore, to uphold lower courts which
do the same. As noted earlier in this Article, however, the courts of appeals
2 47 The Court
have not adopted a uniform or consistent approach on this issue.
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, for example, does not accord very much
weight to revenue rulings. Thus, in Flanaganv. United States,2'48 that court
reversed a district court decision which had deferred to an IRS revenue
2 49
ruling.

It simply makes no sense for the courts to apply different standards of
deference to revenue rulings. Inconsistent treatment of similarly situated
taxpayers and the inevitable expenditure of judicial resources to correct the
differences suggest that the standards followed by all courts should be
50
homogenous.
Id. at 738 n.6; see Walt Disney Inc. v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 221 (1991), rev'd,
4 F.3d
735 (9th Cir. 1993).
2 47
See discussion suprapart III.B.
248 59 A.F.T.R.2d 87-1253 (W.D. Okla. 1982), rev'd, 810 F.2d 930 (10th Cir. 1987).
249 Id. at 1258. The court stated: "Revenue rulings are comparable to attorney
general's opinions. They represent only the IRS's opinion of what the law requires, issued
for the information and guidance of taxpayers, IRS officials, and others concerned. They do
not have the force and effect of law, although they are entitled to consideration." Flanagan,
810 F.2d at 934. The court further asserted that revenue rulings "are accorded less weight
than regulations, which are promulgated in accordance with the requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act and finalized only after a period for comment by concerned
parties." Id.
250 A similar problem is presented when administrative agencies refuse to administer
programs consistently with holdings of the courts of appeals. Where an agency has
"nonacquiesced," those who pursue claims in court are granted greater rights, because they
ultimately win, than those who choose to comply with agency actions. William W. Buzbee,
Note, Administrative Agency IntracircuitNonacquiescence, 85 CoLUM. L. REv. 582, 603
246

(1985).
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B. Deference Encourages UnrestrainedAdministrativeActivity
Because IRS revenue rulings receive deference in most federal courts, the
IRS obtains a significant advantage by issuing them. The availability of
deference actually encourages the IRS to issue rulings because the mere
existence of a relevant revenue ruling improves the likelihood of the agency
prevailing in cases that present the issue and may even assure a victory. It is
precisely because the position is embodied in a ruling (rather than a regulation),
however, that careful judicial scrutiny is mandated. In the case of regulations,
judicial deference is sensible because the public has been afforded an
opportunity to participate in the issuance process. In the case of revenue
rulings, judicial review should serve as a counterbalance to public
nonparticipation at time of issuance.
In practical terms, public participation is important for two reasons. First,
the combined expertise and knowledge of agency administrators and interested
persons results in better rules. 251 Members of particular groups or industries
possess a wealth of information from which agencies benefit in the drafting of
rules. 25 2 Public input also offsets institutional biases in favor of or against a
particular group, 25 3 and enables affected persons to defend themselves against
rules that may be detrimental to their interests. 25 4 Second, the notice and
comment procedure serves as a quasi-democratic process by enabling affected
persons to articulate their views and by requiring agencies, who are not directly
accountable to voters, to read and respond to comments. 255 Notice and
comment procedures enable those with opposing viewpoints to attempt to
influence agency action in an open fashion and minimize opportunities for
6
administrative decisionmaking behind closed doors. 25
Interpretive rules are expressly exempt from the APA notice and comment
procedures. 25 7 Although Congress appreciated the benefits of public
251 See Asimow, supranote 18, at 574; Galler, supra note 9, at 865-66.
252 (Jaller, supra note 9, at 865-66.
253 See Asimow, supranote 18, at 574.
25 4
See Arthur E. Bonfield, Some Tentative Thoughts on Public Participationin the
Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy Under the A.P.A., 23
ADM[N. L. REV. 101, 104 (1971). Dissenters also are more likely to accept an adverse rule,
and are less likely to subvert the rule, if they have had the opportunity to participate in the
drafting process. See Asimow, supra note 18, at 574; Arthur E. Bonfield, Public
Participationin FederalRulemaling Relating to Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits,
or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 541 (1970).
255 See Asimow, supra note 18, at 574; Galler, supra note 9, at 866-67.
256 See Asimow, supranote 18, at 574.
257 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (1994); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313-14
(1979).
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participation, it feared that the necessity of complying with cumbersome
procedures would discourage agencies from disseminating policy statements. 25 8
Thus, Congress exempted interpretive rules from the notice and comment
requirements in order to encourage agencies to issue rules and policy
statements259-that is, pronouncements that would merely interpret or explain
statutes but that would not affect individual rights or obligations. 260 What was
lost by eliminating the public, however, was made up for by the prospect of
meaningful judicial review; 261 the possibility of careful scrutiny by a judge was
thought to compensate for the loss of public participation in the rulemaking
process.
Interpretive treasury regulations do not conform to the standard paradigm
because the Treasury Department voluntarily complies with APA notice and
comment procedures when it issues them. 262 Courts nonetheless review them

258 See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., 2D SEss., ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE 7 (Comm. Print 1945) [hereinafter COMM. PRINT], reprintedin SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATiVE PROcEDuRE Acr: LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, S. Doc. No.
248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946) [hereinafter APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].

259 See Bonfield, Some Tentative Thouglts on Public Participationin the Making of
InterpretativeRules and GeneralStatements of Policy Under the A.P.A., supra note 254, at
122-23. Despite the absence of notice and comment issuance procedures, interpretive rules
are thought to provide a number of benefits. First, these rules afford advance notice to the
public of an agency's position on substantive matters, enabling affected persons to act in
reliance on government positions, and thereby to avoid surprises. See Asimow, supra note
18, at 529; Strauss, supra note 38, at 1481-82. Opportunities for later controversy also are
minimized. See id.; cf PETER L. STRAUSS, AN INTRoDucriON TO ADMI~NSrATIvE JusnCE
INTHE UNITED STATES 157 (1989) (asserting that "[algencies issue these interpretations and
opinions precisely to shape external behavior, reducing to that extent the need for regulatory
enforcement"). Second, interpretive rules assist regulated persons in complying with the
law. See Asimow, supra note 18, at 529. Third, by providing guidance to administrators,
interpretive rules promote the uniform administration of a statute. See Michael Asimow,
Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DuKE L.J. 381, 385; Strauss,
supra note 38, at 1482. Finally, the mere existence of published interpretations disposes of
many issues because few agency interpretations are challenged in court and almost all are
upheld. See Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Refonn, supra, at 385
(citing Chevrn); see also supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text (describing benefits of
IRS revenue
rulings).
260
See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text (defining interpretive and legislative
rules).
261 See COMM. PRINT, supra note 258, at 7, reprinted in APA: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 258, at 18; 92 CONG. REC. 2155 (1946), reprinted in APA: LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY,
supra note 258, at 313 (statement of Sen. McCarran).
2 62
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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under interpretive standards, not legislative ones, 2 63 although Chevron may

264
have elevated the status of interpretive regulations.
Revenue rulings are always issued outside of the APA process. Consistent
with Congress's initial expectations, the procedural ease with which revenue
rulings are issued enables the IRS to publish them frequently and promptly,
thereby providing assistance to taxpayers. Should a taxpayer take issue with a
revenue ruling position, however, Congress envisioned a thorough court
review. By deferring to IRS revenue rulings, courts ignore the rationale
underlying the APA procedures and effectively encourage the IRS to issue
interpretations in the revenue ruling format rather than as regulations, which
require compliance with cumbersome procedures but which offer the public an
opportunity to restrain or limit arbitrary actions.
Clearly, the IRS should continue its practice of issuing revenue rulings
because they provide important benefits to both taxpayers and the government.
But the agency should not issue revenue rulings as a means of obtaining an
advantage in litigation. 265 The status of revenue rulings should be more like
that of letter rulings, whose role is to inform taxpayers in advance of the IRS's
treatment of particular transactions. Taxpayers are afforded the opportunity to
complete their tax returns in conformity with IRS positions and government
agents are able to enforce the laws uniformly. Taxpayers who disagree with
revenue ruling positions, however, should be permitted to litigate their
differences in courts that fairly consider arguments put forth by both sides.

C. CurrentPracticesDefy Conventional Wisdom Regarding Pro-

Government Bias of Specialized Courts
In scholarly debates over the virtues (or vices) of specialized courts, a
principal argument made against specialized courts is that they are biased.
Specialization can produce bias because the judicial selection process favors
interested groups and judicial review processes favor those who litigate
266
repeatedly in the specialized fora.
263 See cases cited supranote 26.
264 See supranotes 65-98 and accompanying text.

265 In response to legislative proposals to grant the EPA interpretive authority under
the CERCLA liability scheme, see supra note 172. Professor Craig Johnston noted the
overwhelming temptation to "correct" adverse judicial opinions by promulgating rules that
subsequent courts would then be bound to follow. Johnston, supra note 172, at 1052.
266
Bruff, supra note 224, at 331-32; see also Plager, supra note 204, at 858
(observing that specialist courts are likely to identify with government programs that are
within their specialties); Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative

Lawnaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1111, 1153 (1990) (concluding that "compared to
generalist judges, specialized judges are likely to be more biased arbiters of whether an
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Commentators allege that the Tax Court maintains a pro-government bias
as a result of the appointment of former Treasury or IRS officials to
judgeships2 67 or its cordial relationship with the IRS, which is a party to every
case presented to the court. 268 Professor Deborah Geier has compiled statistics
269
that demonstrate "a decided pro-government trend in recent years."
Opinions are divided on the partiality of Tax Court judges, however.
Former Chief Judge Tannenwald, for example, has argued that the court is not
pro-government, dismissing that assertion as a longstanding "canard." 270

agency has strayed beyond the bounds of its delegated authority"); cf. POSNER, supra note
230, at 155 (arguing that specialists are more likely to enforce laws vigorously because they
identify with the goals of government programs that represent the focus of their careers).
267

See HENRY 1. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICnON: A GENERAL VIEW 166 (1973)

(describing the feeling that an "unduly large proportion" of the members of the Tax Court
are former government attorneys who are slanted in the government's favor); Bruff, supra
note 224, at 336 (referring to the Tax Court's "longstanding reputation as overstaffed with
former government lawyers and, hence, biased against the taxpayer"); Revesz, supra note
266, at 1152-53 (describing congressional efforts to prohibit service on the Tax Court and
predecessor courts by former government officials as a result of years of bias).
268 See Revesz, supra note 266, at 1152; Cf. ABA Sec. of Tax'n, Report on the
Creation of a National Court of Tax Appeals (Dec. 14, 1989), available in LEXIS, Fedtax
Library, TNT File, search term 90 TNT 30-8 (arguing that taxpayers would question the
fairness of conferring exclusive jurisdiction to a single tax court "before whom the
government
appears in every case").
2 69
Deborah A. Geier, The Tax Court, Article III, and the ProposalAdvanced by the
FederalCourts Study Committee: A Study in Applied ConstitutionalTheory, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 985, 998 (1991). Professor Geier's statistics demonstrate that in several selected years,
the government won or partially won an average of 90.4% of Tax Court cases, compared
with an average of 70.5% in the district courts. Id. at 998. But see Bruff, supra note 224, at
337 (arguing that the Tax Court's substantial caseload, which comprises over 90% of all tax
cases, demonstrates that taxpayers regard the court as neutral). Geier argues that the Tax
Court should be elevated to Article III status as a means of avoiding any potential for progovernment bias. Geier, supraat 998-1000.
27 0
Theodore Tannenwald, Jr., The Tax LitigationProcess: Where It Is and Where It Is
Going, 44 REc. Ass'N B. CrrY OF N.Y. 825, 827 (1989). Judge Tannenwald supports his
conclusion with three premises. First, the ability to file a Tax Court petition without first
paying the disputed tax encourages the filing of cases with little or no merit. Statistics
emanating from these cases are skewed in favor of the government. Second, because most
Tax Court cases involve multiple issues, split decisions regularly occur. It is difficult to
determine who wins in a case in which there is no clear victor. Third, the number of former
government attorneys who serve as Tax Court judges has declined. Id. at 827-28; see also
Bruff, supra note 224, at 336-37 (arguing that a pro-government bias in the Tax Court is
unlikely). But see 15 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 42,751 (June 23, 1994) (indicating that
12 of the 17 regular judges of the Tax Court previously served as government tax
attorneys).
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While a critique of the debate is beyond the scope of this Article, the fact
of non-deference to revenue rulings by the Tax Court and deference by the
federal courts stands conventional wisdom on its head. The accepted practice in
the specialist Tax Court is to scrutinize all government arguments previously
asserted in revenue rulings, while the generalist federal judges are likely to
accede to government revenue ruling positions-a decidedly pro-government
practice.
D. Deference by GeneralistCourts Confises TraditionalJustifications
for ConcurrentJurisdictionover Tax Litigation
The courts' divergent approaches to the issue of deference frustrate the
underlying objectives of the jurisdictional structure in tax litigation. The
trifurcated jurisdictional system in which tax controversies are litigated271
satisfies taxpayer perceptions of fairness because specialist and generalist
options are both available, and the regional appellate court system, in which
generalist judges review opinions issued by specialists and generalists, offers
the advantages of intercircuit dialogue and percolation. If generalist judges in
the federal courts are unwilling, however, to share their own perspectives in
revenue rulings cases, and choose instead to reflexively defer to the IRS, then
the benefits that they are presumed to provide are not available. Although
deference to revenue rulings itself is probably not enough to justify a complete
reassessment of jurisdiction over tax litigation, it certainly raises the question
whether some of the underlying premises are false.
In a 1990 report that advocated extensive changes to the nation's court
system, the Federal Courts Study Committee of the Judicial Conference of the
United States recommended restricting all tax litigation to an expanded Tax
Court and creating an appellate division of the Tax Court with exclusive
jurisdiction over tax appeals. 272 The proposal would have vested virtually
exclusive tax jurisdiction in the Tax Court and would have removed all
The Tax Court, federal district courts, and the Court of Federal Claims share
concurrent jurisdiction over tax controversies. See supra note 8. For an exhaustive analysis
of the issues presented by the choice of forum, see Crimm, supra note 8.
2 72
FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 235, at 69-72. Under the proposal, district
courts would retain jurisdiction over criminal tax cases, enforcement actions to fix jeopardy
assessments, and actions to enforce federal tax liens. Id. at 70. Appeals from those cases
would go to the regional courts of appeals. Id.
The 1990 proposal was the most recent attempt to restructure jurisdiction over tax
271

cases. See, e.g., Gary W. Carter, The Conmissioner's Nonacquiescence: A Case for a

National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 879, 910-14 (1986) (describing 1979
proposals to create a national court of tax appeals); Worthy, supra note 202, at 250-51
(describing 1969 proposals to alter the structure of tax litigation).
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participation by generalist judges from the tax litigation process. The proposals
were never acted upon, largely due to the near unanimous opposition by the tax
bar, whose objections emphasized the importance of both specialist and
generalist judges. 273 Indeed, concern was expressed that taxpayers would

consider inherently unfair a judicial system that eliminated any opportunity for
274
generalist review.

Generalist judges possess a breadth of experience that brings a wider
perspective to their decisionmaking. Because their cases present a multitude of
issues, generalists' decisions are informed by exposure to a wide range of
problems, and questions are reviewed in a broader context than normally
presented to specialists. 275 Legal issues that emerge in more than one area
present opportunities for "cross-fertilization"

276

or "cross-pollination"

277

See Remarks of Shirley D. Peterson, Asst. U.S. Att'y Gen., Tax Div., quoted in
Hoerner, supra note 223, at 1256; Letter from Walter H. Beckham, Jr., Sec'y, Am. Bar
Assoc. (ABA), to Kenneth Gideon, Asst. Sec'y for Tax Policy (Mar. 8, 1990), available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, search term 90 TNT 84-29; Letter from Richard G.
Cohen, Chair, and James T. Chudy, Sec'y, Council on Tax'n of the Ass'n of the Bar of the
City of N.Y., to Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chair, Fed. Cts. Study Comm. (Mar. 7, 1990),
available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, search term 90 TNT 63-19; Letter from C.
Wells Hall, III, Vice Chair, Nat'l Ass'n of State Bar Tax Sections, to Joseph F. Weis, Jr.
(Mar. 16, 1990), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, search term 90 TNT 6318; Letter from Arthur S. Hoffman, Chair, Fed. Tax'n Exec. Comm., Am. Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants, to Joseph F. Weis, Jr. (Feb. 12, 1990), available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File, search term 90 TNT 46-24; Letter from James P. Holden,
Chair, ABA See. of Tax'n, to Joseph F. Weis, Jr. (Mar. 5, 1990), available in LEXIS,
Fedtax Library, TNT File, search term 90 TNT 63-17; Testimony of Judge Arthur N'ims,
supra note 211. But see Ginsburg, supra note 223 (supporting proposals); Letter from
Sheldon S. Cohen, Former Comm'r, IRS, to Joseph F. Weis, Jr. (Jan. 30, 1990), available
in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File, search term 90 TNT 26-19 (supporting proposals).
273

274

See FEDERAL COURTS REPORT, supra note 235, at 72 (dissenting statement of

Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr.); Letter from Hoffman, supra note 273; Letter from Holden,
supra note 273. Professor Dreyfuss has argued that the success of the trifurcated tax
litigation system is based in large measure on the availability of specialized and generalist
courts. "Having a choice of courts diffuses suspicion that the process is stacked in favor of
the government because taxpayers who are wary of specialized tribunals can usually use the
district courts. At the same time, those who would like special expertise can exploit the
proficiency of the Tax Court." Dreyfuss, supra note 202, at 436 (footnote omitted).
275 See Bruff, supra note 224, at 331; Jordan, supra note 228, at 748; Saltzman, supra
note 27
227,
at 77; Remarks by Justice Antonin Scalia, supra note 235, at 9-10.
6
Bruff, supra note 224, at 331.
277 POSNER,supra note 230, at 156-57; Dreyfuss, supra note 202, at 379.
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among legal theories; the manner in which issues are resolved in one area may
278
apply in other areas as well.
Although the courts of appeals may disagree among themselves or with the
Tax Court on a particular matter, these disagreements create a dialogue which
leads to better decisionmaking overall. Where courts adopt dissimilar positions,
the experience of persons affected by those decisions provides data or
information to other courts that have yet to consider the issue. The ability to
compare the effects of distinct rules aids these courts in reaching their own
conclusions. 279 The tax litigation system assures an intercircuit dialogue in
which controversial issues are thoroughly considered, ultimately resulting in
reasonable final resolutions. 280 This experiential dialogue does not exist,
however, where courts abdicate decisionmaking responsibility by deferring
unquestioningly to one litigant.
Intercircuit dialogue also aids the Supreme Court in adjudicating cases
involving intercircuit conflicts. Permitting issues to "percolate" over time
before they are definitively resolved offers three distinct benefits. First,
doctrinal disagreements serve to isolate issues on which appeals courts are
divided, thereby assisting the Supreme Court in identifying questions that need
resolution. 281 The converse is true as well. If most lower courts adopt
consistent approaches to a particular subject, the Supreme Court can presume
that the issue has been correctly decided and that further review is
unnecessary. 282 Second, lower court opinions serve as ancillary briefs, which
articulate and analyze the issues presented without the biases of the litigating
parties. 283 Thus, the Court confronts a variety of perspectives when it
ultimately renders a decision. 284 Finally, the experiences of the circuits provide
278 See POSNER, supra note 230, at 156-57; Bruff, supra note 224, at 331; Dreyfuss,
supra note 202, at 379; cf. Revesz, supra note 266, at 1163 (arguing that because they

come from narrow segments of the profession and only adjudicate cases inside their areas of
specialization, specialist judges are less likely than their generalist colleagues to be exposed
to a wide range of legal issues).
279 Revesz, supra note 266, at 1157; see also POSNER, supra note 230, at 156.
280
See Letter from C. Wells Hall, I1, supra note 273.
281 Revesz, supra note 266, at 1157.
282
Id. at 1159 n.188.

283 Id. at 1157; cf. Todd J. Tiberi, Comment, Supreme Court Denialsof Certiorariin
Conflicts Cases: Percolationor Procrastination?,54 U. Prfr. L. REV. 861, 864-66 (1993)
(describing a process of "legal Darwinism" in which the weaker arguments are weeded out,
leaving the Court with only the stronger ones, ensuring a proper result).
284
Daniel J. Meador, A CWllenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifing the Regional
Design of the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 603, 633 (1989); see also Letter
from William F. Burke, Chair, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, to Prof. Daniel J. Meador, Chair,
ABA Standing Comm. on Fed. Judicial Improvements, and to Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chair,
Fed. Cts. Study Comm. (Jan. 9, 1990), available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File,
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an empirical data base, which the Court can use in fashioning its own
2 85
decision.
It is often asserted that in matters of tax law, uniformity often trumps
decisional methodology. 286 In Justice Brandeis's words, "it is more important
that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." 28 7 Where
circuits apply different rules, identical transactions are taxed differently
depending upon which circuit's interpretations apply. 2 88 Taxpayers in one
circuit, thus, do not pay the same taxes as similarly situated persons in other
circuits. 289

Moreover, these distinctions create undue opportunities for forum
shopping; taxpayers may choose to litigate tax consequences of a single
transaction in any of three trial level courts, with appellate jurisdiction in two
courts of appeals. 290 Transactional planning also becomes difficult, particularly
where a transaction occurs in more than one circuit.291 Indeed, the quest for
uniformity is a major factor relied upon by those who advocate expanded use of
specialized courts. 292 Decisional incoherence breeds a loss of faith in the
system's fairness and may prompt taxpayers to seek unlawful means of
293
avoiding taxes.

search term 90 TNT 15-12. Professor Meador describes the percolation argument as "a
euphemism for incoherence" when it is applied in statutory interpretation cases (as opposed
to constitutional questions). He argues that courts are bound to implement congressional
intent without generating uncertainties over prolonged periods, and that Congress can
always set the matter right if the judiciary misspeaks congressional will. Meador, supra at

633-34.
285 Revesz, supra note 266, at 1157; Tiberi, supra note 283, at 865-66.
286

See, e.g., Martin D. Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through the JudicialProcess,70

A.B.A. J. 74, 74 (1984); Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57
HARV. L. REv. 1153, 1159-60 (1944); Jordan, supra note 228, at 749-50; f FRmNDLY,
supra note 267, at 167; Revesz, supra note 266, at 1158 (describing some cases as "trivial
conflicts of the 'whether to drive on the right or drive on the left' type," in which "[ilt
makes little difference which side of the road we drive on as long as we all drive on the
same side"). In First Charter Financial Corp. v. United States, 669 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th
Cir. 1982), the court stated that "[ulniformity among the circuits is especially important in
tax cases to ensure equal and certain administration of the tax system."
287
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
288 Carter, supra note 272, at 900; Meador, supra note 284, at 618. Carter argues that
the IRS's nonacquiescence policies contribute to disuniformity, despite the IRS's assertions
to the contrary. Carter, supra note 272, at 900-906.
289 Tiberi, supra note 283, at 867.
2 90
Revesz, supranote 266, at 1116.
291 Meador, supranote 284, at 618-19.
2 92
Bruff, supranote 224, at 331.
293 Carter, supra note 272, at 11; Jordan, supra note 228, at 750.
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Where there is a need simply for a rule, the emergent practice of the circuit
courts to defer to IRS revenue rulings does not accomplish uniformity because
the courts have adopted divergent protocols. Even if all of the appellate courts
were to agree on one deference standard, however, there would at best be two
rules, unless the Tax Court relented from its position. Until all courts adopt
conforming deference standards or the Supreme Court issues a definitive
ruling, dissonance will continue to describe the prevailing state.
VI. DEFINING AN APPROPRIATE STANDARD

Taxpayers who litigate issues that are addressed in revenue rulings are
confronted with an onerous choice. If they opt for the generalist federal courts,
their chances for success are profoundly diminished by the likelihood that the
court will defer to the IRS. The Tax Court will consider taxpayer arguments on
their merits but at the cost of an arguably pro-government bias. 294 Deference
practices are procedural yet they have a substantial impact on substantive
resolution of tax disputes. It simply makes no sense to treat similarly situated
taxpayers differently where they engage in identical transactions, and it is
surprising that such divergent practices have been tolerated.
All courts should follow one uniform standard and the judges of the circuit
courts should conform their diverse approaches. In light of the variety of
directions in which the courts have been moving, however, it is highly unlikely
that these judges could agree on a single rule.
A seemingly logical solution might entail the Tax Court relinquishing its
non-deference stance and following the circuit courts. This result seems
reasonable from a policy standpoint because in theory, the Tax Court is bound
by applicable circuit court precedents. Although I believe that the Tax Court's
position is tie correct one, 295 it may be that non-deference is now a relic of the
past. The Tax Court cannot practically follow circuit court precedent, however,
because there is no single standard, and the Tax Court would end up applying a
variety of rules depending upon the court to which a particular case is
appealable.
I believe that the issue of deference is best resolved by the Supreme Court.
The plethora of diverse and conflicting approaches followed by the lower
courts suggests a need for high court resolution. The issue has percolated long
enough to show that the question is ripe for review and to provide the Court
with the benefit of experiential data. Indeed, the Court has hinted of its
2 94

By choosing to litigate in the Tax Court, taxpayers also give up their right to a jury
trial. For a discussion of the differences among the three trial level courts with jurisdiction
over civil tax controversies, see Crimm, supra note 8.
295 See Galler, supra note 9, at 890-92.
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willingness to consider the issue and should seriously consider resolving the
matter at this time.
Absent judicial resolution, the deference issue could be resolved by
prohibiting citation of revenue rulings in court, as authority for substantive
arguments. Of course, there is no institutional incentive for the IRS to
unilaterally and voluntarily suspend this practice, as the agency is likely to
prevail whenever revenue rulings are cited. Therefore, legislative action would
be necessary. Congress should consider enacting a rule as to revenue rulings
that is similar to Internal Revenue Code section 61100), which now applies to
letter rulings, stating simply that revenue rulings may not be used or cited as
296
precedent.
However the matter is resolved, standards of review must be uniform so
that all taxpayers receive equal treatment regardless of domicile or choice of
forum. Increased deference in the federal courts has fractured the foundational
basis for concurrent jurisdiction and created an untenable situation for
taxpayers involved in tax disputes with the government.

296 It is unlikely that such a statute would violate constitutional separation of powers
principles. Like the Federal Rules of Evidence, such a rule would represent a
congressionally enacted limitation on the materials that courts may consider in rendering

decisions. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-94
(1993) (interpreting an evidentiary rule as it would any statute); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.5, at 50 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that Congress
has the authority to prescribe rules of procedure which Article III courts must apply).

